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Summary 
On 29 December, 1996 the conflict in Guatemala between the URNG, a leftist guerrilla 
organization, and the authoritarian state came to an end. With the implementation of the 
peace agreements and the completion of peace-building, Guatemala has without doubt 
taken an important step on the road to democracy. However, the country’s regime does 
not guarantee a civilized life for its citizens. Even by Latin American standards, it permits 
an extremely high level of violence. This can be characterized as violence in peace. Al-
though the rates of homicide conditioned by this violence are higher than those that pre-
vailed during the civil war, there is no danger of a return to war. During the war political 
violence was the main cause of death, and violent crime has now taken its place.  
This report analyses three forms of postwar violence which are especially typical of 
Guatemala: political violence, the maras, and lynch law. It then goes on to examine their 
causes. In the course of this examination, a number of elements which are generally sup-
posed to be causes of violence are excluded as causal factors: the perpetuation of a culture 
of violence or/and war-violence racism and ethnic exclusion, poverty, and inequality in 
the sense of a general distribution of income as measured by the Gini coefficient. In the 
next step, an alternative model of explanation is presented. This distinguishes between 
enabling structures which make violence possible and structures that might prevent it 
(with particular reference to the absence of preventive structures). The report identifies 
regime hybridity and a rent economy as structures that make violence possible, and inves-
tigates these structures in order to identify the concrete configurations which are imma-
nent to the structures and cause violence. In the case of the rent economy, the specific 
structures identified are the especially pronounced bipolarity between the oligarchy and 
the lowest quintile of the population, new rents as outlets for oligarchical structures and 
catalysts of violence, low rates of investment, and a low level of empowerment of work. 
However, none of these structures is, on its own, a cause of the high intensity of violence; 
they form a complex system. The absence in Guatemala of a structure that could prevent 
violence can be identified in the poor performance of the security sector, i.e. the police 
and judiciary, and in the lack of democratic commitment on the part of civil society in 
this sector. This low level of performance is, in addition to political exclusion and the 
absence of the rule of law, a characteristic feature of regime hybridity. 
Although this report is a case study, it has an intrinsically comparative character. This 
is because the other Central American countries (El Salvador and Honduras with a higher, 
and Costa Rica and Nicaragua with a lower intensity of violence) form the matrix which 
renders visible the specificity of Guatemala. Nicaragua is of particular significance for this 
implicit comparison, because it is the only country in Central America that has experi-
enced a civil war in the recent past but seen a low level of violence since the end of that 
war. 
The conclusion of the report identifies two ways in which violence, or the intensity of 
violence, can be limited in the long term. In the Costa Rican model, a low intensity of 
violence has been achieved directly, via a long historical path in which “Democracy = 
Performance + Democratic Content” is combined with “Social Market = Empowerment 
 II 
of Labour + Production of Investment Goods”. In the Nicaraguan model, a low intensity 
of violence has been achieved indirectly but over a shorter period of time; here, there can 
be no doubt about the absence of democracy, and therefore the existence of regime hy-
bridity, or the absence of a social market economy, and therefore the existence of a rent 
economy. The main finding of the report follows from the Nicaraguan model: the level of 
violence can be reduced even though ethnically based exclusion, poverty, and inequality 
(as measured by the Gini coefficient) are present, and even though a rent economy and 
regime hybridity are present as well.  
If violence is to be successfully reduced, it is necessary for the police and judiciary to be 
supported conceptually and practically in their efforts to prevent violence and to rehabili-
tate violent offenders, and to bring about improvements in criminal investigation prac-
tices, the support provided to victims, and consistent criminal justice policies. Develop-
ment aid can help in all these areas. Simultaneously, measures must be taken to bring 
about the empowerment of civil society – which, however, should not mean the empow-
erment of vigilantism. In addition, the situation of the lowest quintile of the population 
should be improved in such a way that there is at least a prospect of relative socioeco-
nomic egalitarianism. This can be done if smaller enterprises are strengthened so that they 
can serve as a counterweight to the ruling oligarchy, in the context of an improvement in 
the rate of investment in the production of investment goods. In this way it would be 
possible to reduce both the official level of unemployment and the concealed unemploy-
ment that exists in the informal sector, leading to the empowerment of work. These 
autochthonous policies are necessary for Guatemala, and they should be combined with 
the exertion of international political pressure on the USA’s problematic policies on im-
migration, integration, and deportation. This should include the provision of support to 
Guatemala (as well as El Salvador and Honduras) for the integration of young people 
deported from the USA. 
This report presents the first systematic analysis of postwar violence in Guatemala. It is 
based on approximately 50 interviews with Guatemalan academics, politicians, police and 
judicial officers, Maya priests, and NGO activists, and also with violent offenders, all of 
whom were interviewed during a month-long period of field research in Guatemala in 
March 2006. 
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1. Introduction 
Guatemala has enjoyed peace for the last ten years.1 The war between the leftist guerrilla 
organization, the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), and the state 
was brought to an end in 1996 with peace agreements. The five critical years needed for 
peace to be regarded as consolidated are also over,2 and there have been no further armed 
clashes between the former warring parties. But this postwar period has seen an increase 
rather than a decline in violence.3 It is true that El Salvador, rather than Guatemala, has 
the highest homicide rate in contemporary Central America, but Guatemala’s predomi-
nantly criminal violence places it in the top three of the most violent Latin American 
countries.4 This can be characterized as violence in peace. It does not fulfil the criteria for 
a war, and for the most part it does not involve ex-combatants – though this does not 
mean that it causes fewer deaths. No explanation of this paradox has yet been offered, and 
the main concern of this report is to provide one. Up until now, the literature on security 
governance in postwar societies has been unable to conceptualize violence in peace. 
During the war, one could hope to keep out of the way of violence by avoiding conflict 
zones and not expressing any political opinions. In Guatemala today, even this degree of 
caution will not help much. Violence in Guatemala has neither time nor place; anyone can 
fall victim to it, by day as well as by night, in the capital city and the provinces, in poor 
districts and in front of the expensive hotels. This violence has no front lines, and does not 
even necessarily require a motive. People are killed not just in order to defend a 
neighbourhood, to collect “taxes”, or in the course of the theft of a mobile phone, but 
sometimes just for the sake of it. When a murder does involve money, the sum is often 
alarmingly small: members of mara gangs demand the equivalent of $3 from bus passen-
gers, and if they do not pay they are killed.5 No cost-benefit model can provide any kind of 
explanation when corpses are found that have been shot twelve times, or cannot be identi-
fied because they have been dismembered or the head has been cut off. Here are some of 
the headlines from a single page of the newspaper Prensa Libre, from 5 November 2005: 
“Killed in front of her children”, “Dismembered”, “Attack on bus”, “Shot”. 
There is very little to indicate that this terrible state of affairs will change in the foresee-
able future. The police and judiciary are unable to deal with the situation, and are often 
among the victims of violence. It is therefore unsurprising that the police do not respond 
to emergency calls, look the other way, release violent criminals they have caught in the 
 
 
 
1 I define peace here as the absence of war. 
2 Roy Licklider, The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945 – 1993, in: American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 4, 2000, pp. 779-801. 
3 I understand violence as physical violence, in the sense of violare, to injure. See Heinrich Popitz, 
Phänomene der Machtbildung, Tübingen (J. C. B. Mohr) 1992, p. 48.  
4 Homicide is the more comprehensive term and includes both murder and manslaughter.  
5 On the concept of maras, see section 3.2.1. 
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act, dump corpses outside their own area of responsibility, and do not investigate crimes 
properly or demand extra pay for doing so. Nor is it surprising that the police should, in 
order to demonstrate that they are clearing up some crimes, arrest people who have quite 
obviously been doing nothing more than walk around in a “suspicious” manner and then 
plant marijuana in their pockets so as to have some “proof”. People who witness crimes 
and make statements to the police must be both heroic and tired of life, as there is a high 
probability that they will not survive. If a member of a mara gang wants to abandon his 
life of violence, he can be sure that his “friends” will take violent revenge unless he can 
convince them that his motives are purely religious. But even then he will only be able to 
“keep quiet”, and will still be considered a marero. If a young person wants to have noth-
ing to do with the gangs and their violence, he will be forced to abandon his resistance 
when he is told that the price to be paid will be the death of his father and mother. 
What are the reasons for this situation? What is the explanation for the persistence and 
the excessive nature of violence in Guatemala, long after the end of the war? Is there so 
much violence in the country because there has always been so much violence there? Is 
what we can observe simply a continuation of war-violence by other means, or have new, 
specific causes of violence emerged in the postwar period? Is the high level of violence 
caused by poverty, inequality, and racism, i.e. long-term phenomena that could not be 
uprooted by the peace agreements, or is it “only” due to problems arising in a transitional 
period in which the old security sector no longer functions and no new one has yet taken 
its place? None of these arguments is entirely false, and none of them is altogether correct. 
This report sets out to track down the forms of violence in contemporary Guatemala, 
and goes on to attempt to identify their causes. In addition to Guatemala, there are two 
further Central American countries where the indicators of violence are extremely high 
(El Salvador and Honduras) and two where they are relatively low (Costa Rica and Nica-
ragua). If we want to establish the causes of violence in Guatemala, we will have to look 
for factors that are not present, or not present in the relevant combination, in Costa Rica 
and Nicaragua, but are present in Guatemala and, perhaps, in El Salvador and Honduras 
as well. Nicaragua, like Guatemala, is a postwar society, but unlike Guatemala it has a low 
level of violence; the report therefore treats Nicaragua as a particularly instructive com-
parative case, although it examines the country as a point of reference and does not at-
tempt to provide a comprehensive account. 
No systematic analysis of either the forms or the causes of violence in postwar Guatemala 
has yet been published. This report thus breaks new ground and must attempt to put to-
gether a jigsaw puzzle made up of many individual empirical pieces. It is based on 50 inter-
views with Guatemalan academics, politicians, police and judicial officers, Maya priests, and 
NGO activists, and also with violent offenders. The offenders were interviewed by the au-
thor in four penal institutions. Not all of the interviewees have been directly quoted.6 
 
 
 
6 None of this research would have been possible without the support of the Deutsche Forschungsgemein-
schaft, the embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Guatemala, the Konrad Adenauer, Friedrich 
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2. Homicide rates: developments and comparisons 
Even though physical violence cannot be reduced to homicide, this report will for the 
most part restrict its analysis of the intensity of violence to this indicator because it is the 
most reliable one.7 Here too, though, one finds that different figures are given by the po-
lice, the public prosecutor’s office, forensic scientists, the Ombudsman for Human Rights, 
and NGOs. Figures provided by NGOs tend to be significantly higher, and those provided 
by the police significantly lower. There are no comprehensive statistics covering the de-
velopment of violence in the wartime and postwar periods.8 It is therefore important to 
bear in mind that Figure 1 is based on a number of different sources. One can assume that 
they are likely to be too high for the war, and too low for the postwar period.9 According 
to police estimates, there were 37.53 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2005,10 while 
the Ombudsman for Human Rights gives the figure of 42 per 100,000.11 Both sources, 
however, give a total figure of 5,338. This statistical problem, which can probably be ex-
plained by differing assumptions about the size of the total population, can be ignored to 
the extent that overestimates of wartime deaths and underestimates of peacetime deaths 
tend to strengthen the argument I have already put forward: average peacetime violence 
has been worse than wartime violence. 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
Ebert, and Friedrich Naumann foundations, the Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, and also – 
and above all – the Guatemalans who agreed to be interviewed. I am very grateful to these institutions and 
individuals. I am especially grateful to Birgit Gerstenberg, who was Deputy to the UN’s High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights in Guatemala at the time I was conducting my research, and without whose sup-
port and encouragement I would not have been able to overcome some of the obstacles I encountered. 
7 CIEN, Estudio sobre la magnitud y el costo de la violencia en Guatemala, Guatemala 2002, p. 7.  
8 No state institution collects data on homicide over a longer period than 14 years; see ibid.  
9 FORPOL, Criminalidad y violencia en Guatemala, Guatemala 2005, p. 25. 
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Sources: For 1966 and 1978: Patrick Ball, Paul Cobrak and Herbert F. Spirer, Violencia Institucional en Gua-
temala, 1960 – 1996: una reflexión cuantitativa, in: shr.aas.org/guatemala/ciidh/qr/spanish/cap6.html. (Last 
updated 10.10.2004). For 1980 – 1986, percentages calculated on the basis of: CIEN, estudio sobre la magnitud 
y el costo de la violencia en Guatemala, Guatemala 2002, p. 26. For 1990 – 1994, percentages calculated on the 
basis of: CIEN, Estudio sobre la magnitud y el costo de la violencia en Guatemala, Guatemala 2002, p. 8. For 
1996 – 2004: FORPOL, Criminalidad y violencia en Guatemala, Guatemala 2005, p. 26. For 2005: Hector 
Escobar, Comisario PNC de Guatemala. II. Convención Antipandilla, 4 – 6 de Abril 2006, San Salvador. 
The level of violence in Guatemala in the postwar period has been higher than the 
Latin American average, which is itself high, and is twice as high as the world average.12 
During the postwar period, from the beginning of 1997 to the end of 2005, a total of 
33,814 people were murdered in Guatemala. If we presuppose a constant level of violence 
and assume 5,000 killings per year (which is fewer than in 2005, when there were 5,338), 
and then multiply this by 36 (the war lasted 36 years), we get a total of 180,000 homicides. 
The actual total for the 36 years of war, though was the lower figure of 150,000. The high 
level of violence remained stable for a time, but from 2000 onwards it rose steadily. The 
most alarming feature of the problem of violence in Guatemala, and also in El Salvador, 
becomes clear if one compares the rates for these two countries with the figures for Costa 
Rica and Nicaragua: 
Figure 2 
Sources: For Costa Rica: www.eldiarioexterior.com/noticia.asp?idarticulo=4070. For Nicaragua: www. 
nicaliving.com/node/view/787 (both last updated: 10.10.05). For Guatemala: FORPOL, Criminalidad y vio-
lencia en Guatemala, Guatemala 2005, p. 26. For El Salvador: www.uca.edu.sv/publica/idhuca/articulos.html 
(Last updated: 10.10.05); author’s own calculations on the basis of total figures and size of populations. 
 
 
 
10 Hector Escobar, Comisario PNC de Guatemala. II. Convención Antipandilla, 4 – 6 de Abril 2006, San 
Salvador. 
11 Procurador de los Derechos Humanos, Las características de las muertes violentas en el país, Guatemala 
Febrero 2006, p. 3. 
12 Mayra Buvinic, Andrew Morrison and Michael Shifter, Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: a 
Framework for Action. Technical Study Sustainable Development Department. Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank, Washington D.C. March 1999, p. 2. 
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Figure 2 shows clearly that Costa Rica, which has always been a special case with a low 
level of violence and remained one even during the Central America conflict, has also 
been an exception since the end of that conflict. The most astonishing thing revealed by 
Figure 2, though, is that Nicaragua, which just like Guatemala and El Salvador experi-
enced a civil war during the Central America conflict, has since 2004 (at the latest) had the 
lowest intensity of violence in the region. In 2005, the gap between Nicaragua and Costa 
Rica on the one hand, and Guatemala and El Salvador on the other, grew even wider.  
Petén, Izabal, Escuintla, Guatemala City, and Jutiapa are the departments with the 
highest homicide rates in Guatemala. With the exceptions of 1997 and 2005, Escuintla has 
always had the worst record. In 2005 Petén headed the list, after the homicide rate there 
had more than doubled within a single year. Guatemala City, the country’s capital, had 
the fourth worst record in 2005.13 If we look at the 5 departments with the highest homi-
cide rates, we see that they are among those that were less affected by the civil war, have a 
low proportion of indígenas in their population, and are not among those with the worst 
poverty14 (they are to be found in the “richer” 50% of the country’s departments), but that 
they are also, with the exception of Jutiapa, not among those with fewest police officers 
per 100,000 inhabitants. As far as poverty is concerned, we can see here a confirmation at 
the subnational level of what the overall Central American comparison shows: Nicaragua, 
when compared with El Salvador and Guatemala, has worse poverty but a much lower 
level of violence. 
With regard to the variety of forms of violence, Guatemala overshadows its Central 
American neighbours Honduras and El Salvador – countries which are, in general terms, 
equally or even more violent. Those affected by violence in Guatemala have identified up 
to 70 different types of violence.15 The impression conveyed by the media is that most of 
the violence is caused by the maras. The government seizes gratefully on this assessment, 
and claims that the maras are responsible for 80% of all killings in the country.16 Re-
searchers specializing in questions of violence on the other hand, consider that violence 
within the family is the dominant form within the Guatemalan order of violence, followed 
by organized crime, with the maras only in third place.17 After this come “social clean-
sing”, lynch law, and femicide,18 with political violence right at the end of the list. Organ-
ized crime bosses hire professional killers, mareros, and even the police to carry out vio-
 
 
 
13 See FORPOL, footnote 9 above, p. 39. 
14 PNUD, Diversidad étnico-cultural: La ciudadanía en un Estado plural. Informe Desarrollo Humano 2005, 
Guatemala 2005, pp. 325-334. 
15 Caroline Moser and Cathy McIlwaine, Violence in a Post-Conflict Context. Urban Poor Perceptions from 
Guatemala, Washington D.C. (The World Bank) 2001, p. 31. 
16 Óscar Berger, quoted in Siglo XXI, 20.12.05. 
17 UNIFEM/GESEM, Violencia social y género en Centroamérica. Guatemala 2004 (Powerpoint presentation). 
18 Femicide, or the killing of women, is the counterpart to the narrower meaning of homicide (the killing of 
men).  
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lent acts on their behalf. This report singles out three forms of violence for analysis: politi-
cal violence, the maras, and lynch law. 
3. Forms of violence and offenders 
3.1. Political violence 
I begin my analysis of forms of violence with political violence, because this is the area 
where there is most continuity between the wartime and postwar periods – even though, 
as already mentioned, political violence comes last in quantitative terms in statistics on 
postwar violence. Violent acts committed by state and non-state actors are classified as 
political if the actors themselves say that their actions arise from a political motivation or 
serve political ends. If this is the case, either the victims or the perpetrators – or both – are 
political actors. 
After the conclusion of the peace agreement, the confrontation between the guerrillas 
and the state did not flare up again, the demobilization of the combatants was carried out 
without any problems, and there is nothing to indicate that any significant number of ex-
combatants have been involved in postwar violence. It is true that there is no longer any 
political violence in Guatemala that is initiated or ordered by the state, but it is equally 
true that political violence continues and that the state has not been able to prevent this. It 
would be more accurate to say that the state tolerates political violence. This political vio-
lence, and its continuation over a prolonged period after the conclusion of the peace 
agreement, is a peculiarity of Guatemala, since this situation is not replicated either in 
Nicaragua (where there is little violence) or in El Salvador (where there is a great deal). 
The actors responsible for postwar political violence are small groups whose members 
either belong to, or have in the past belonged to, the army, the police, private security 
services, or gangs. These people are recruited from an informal network made up of “par-
allel apparatuses”, sometimes known as “hidden powers”,19 the army, especially the secret 
service, and organized crime. The apparatuses can be traced back to the military dictator-
ship and the civil war, when they operated in secret in the framework of the counterinsur-
gency strategy and were responsible for violations of human rights that were not necessar-
ily ordered by the army leadership. At that time, the “parallel apparatuses” already had 
considerable financial resources of their own, which they added to and privatized with the 
help of illegal activities such as smuggling and unauthorized border controls. In order to 
ensure that this source of income would continue to flow, counterinsurgency operations 
were continued in a disproportionate way in the very areas where the guerrillas had al-
ready been defeated. As time passed, the accumulation of financial resources for the “par-
allel apparatuses” became an end in itself, so that the only goal of the apparatuses was that 
 
 
 
19 Susan C. Peacock and Adriana Beltrán, Hidden Powers in Post-Conflict Guatemala. Illegal Armed Groups 
and the Forces behind them, Washington D.C. (WOLA) 2003.  
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this flow of money should not dry up – even after the signature of the peace agreement.20 
In this way the “parallel apparatuses” became part of organized crime and joined forces 
with other organized criminal groups. The apparatuses are not monolithic, and their 
members sometimes compete with one another in such a way that personal rivalries take a 
violent form. In order to be able to continue to enrich themselves without any fear of 
punishment, they use bribery, corruption, and also physical violence in the pursuit of a 
political goal – immunity from prosecution after the end of the war. 
This is why the apparatuses continue to murder judicial officers, activists from human 
rights and Maya groups, and representatives of the political opposition who want to put 
an end to the prevailing impunity of those who violated human rights during the war, 
especially members of the armed forces.21 Probably the most spectacular and perfidious 
political murder since the end of the war was that of Archbishop Monseñor Juan Gerardi 
Conedera, who had presented the report of the church’s Truth Commission (REMHI) 
and was killed on 26 April 1998. The suspected murderer, Byron Lima Oliva, who was at 
that time an army captain, is in detention awaiting trial and claims to be innocent.22 More 
recently there have been an increasing number of murders of public prosecutors, judges, 
and justices of the peace. For the period between 4 March and 20 June 2005 alone, the 
Fundación Myrna Mack has documented six particularly important cases and 99 instances 
where legal proceedings have been instituted in cases of murder, death threats, or other 
forms of attacks on members of the judicial system.23 Among the most widely known of 
these cases were the murders of Judge José Víctor Bautista Orozco and public prosecutor 
Erick Moisés Gálvez Miss in Chiquimula, and attempts to poison employees of the judi-
cial sector. Attacks on human rights activists have declined considerably by comparison 
with the period of armed conflict, but they have not ceased altogether. The people most 
affected by this are activists working to clear up cases of human rights violation and ex-
huming the bodies of victims of the civil war. In 2005 there were 224 attacks on human 
rights activists in Guatemala, whereas in 2004 there had “only” been 122. In 2005 these 
persecutions predominantly took the form of death threats and intimidation, but there 
were also three murders.24 Although one hears frequent rumours to the contrary, there has 
in fact been no single case in Guatemala of an ex-soldier or ex-guerrillero being arrested 
for an act of violence after demobilization.  
 
 
 
20 Author’s interview with Gustavo Porras, Instituto Multipartidario Holandés (who was formerly a member 
of the EGP, Private Secretary to President Álvaro Arzú, head of the government’s delegation to the peace 
negotiations, and signatory to the peace agreement on the government side), 28.3.06. (Unless otherwise 
specified, all interviews mentioned in the rest of this report were conducted by the author in Guatemala.) 
21 Fundación Myrna Mack, Respuesta estatal frente a ataques contra defensores de Derechos Humanos en 
Guatemala, Guatemala Septiembre 2005, p. 4.  
22 Author’s interview with Byron Lima Oliva in the Pavoncito high-security prison, 29.03.06.  
23 Fundación Myrna Mack, Violencia contra el sistema de justicia: el aparato estatal sigue postergando la 
prevención y el combate, Guatemala Julio 2005, p. 1. 
24 Movimiento Nacional por los Derechos Humanos, El terror expande. Análisis de ataques contra defenso-
res y defensoras de Derechos Humanos durante el año 2005, Guatemala 2006, p. 15. 
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3.2. Violent crime 
The category of violent crime covers acts of violence that may potentially be recorded in 
police crime statistics25: everyday acts of illegal violence against individuals, which can be 
distinguished from wars, massacres, genocides, and other forms of political violence be-
cause there is no primarily political motive behind them. In postwar Guatemala, there is 
clearly much more violent crime than political violence. 
3.2.1. The maras 
The violence of the maras is a matter of great public concern in Guatemala.26 Maras are a 
specific type of youth gang with roots in the USA, Canada, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, and Mexico. It has been reported that they are now also present in Spain. On the 
spectrum of contemporary violent crime in Central America the maras are probably the 
most “collective” and best organized actors, and they constitute a regional security prob-
lem. In Guatemala, the police estimated in April 2006 that there were about 60,000 gang 
members in the country, of whom 8,000 were considered beyond rehabilitation.27 Ap-
proximately half of all violent acts committed by mareros are perpetrated against mem-
bers of rival gangs, and roughly one third against the police.28 
There is no other violent actor in Central America that is as difficult to characterize 
precisely as the maras, and assessments of them are extremely contradictory. This applies 
to their origins and their character, their structure, and the amount of violence they 
commit. The government and media claim that the maras are responsible for most of the 
violence in Guatemala.  
As far as the origins of the maras are concerned, some analysts (especially those who 
come from Central America) argue that they were exported from the USA, while others 
(especially US specialists) seek to locate their roots predominantly in Central America 
itself. This report argues that their origins were mixed. One origin of the maras can be 
located on the streets of Los Angeles and other major US cities, where they were mainly 
formed by Central American youths. These youths were the children of immigrants who 
had either fled the civil wars in Guatemala and El Salvador in the 1980s and 90s or gone to 
the USA to look for work. Since the parents had to work to earn their living, their children 
 
 
 
25 Günter Albrecht, Gewaltkriminalität zwischen Mythos und Realität, in: Günter Albrecht, Otto Backes and 
Wolfgang Kühnel (eds), Gewaltkriminalität zwischen Mythos und Realität, Frankfurt am Main (Suhr-
kamp) 2001, p. 9. 
26 The name “mara” was used by Central American youth gangs as long ago as the 1970s and 80s. The term 
comes from “con mis amigos” (with my friends), but it was later traced back to marabunta, fictional killer 
ants who caused great destruction in Brazil in a 1970s film. 
27 El Diario de Hoy, 27.04.06. In the view of researchers specializing in questions of violence, this figure 
should be much higher. Researchers have calculated that in 2003 there were 175,000 mareros in Guate-
mala; see ERIC/IDIES/IUDOP/NITLAPAN/DIRINPRO (eds), Maras y pandillas en Centroamérica. Políti-
cas juveniles y rehabilitación, Volumen III, Managua 2004, p. 93.   
28 See UNIFEM/GESEM, footnote 17 above. 
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were left to their own devices and, in an alien world, looked for support and security in 
groups of like-minded youths – the maras. If they committed criminal offences, the US 
authorities deported them to their countries of origin. They took their gang socialization 
with them, and in their home country – which had itself now become alien – they once 
again looked to the maras for support and security. 
But Guatemala too already had its own gang culture at this time. This had come into 
existence before and during the civil war, and was a form of protest against the violence of 
the military dictatorships that ruled the country during the 1970s and 80s. These gangs 
were influenced both by political movements of school students and by delinquent street 
gangs, but what emerged did not become part of the political left. Nevertheless, these 
gangs, which called themselves “Los Guerreros” (The Warriors), were described as “Los 
Guerrilleros” by the army, which conducted operations against them as if they were guer-
rillas. There were rivalries between these street gangs or gangs of school students, and they 
provided extremely fertile ground for the new arrivals from the USA. They developed into 
mara clones, increasingly so as they were subjected to police repression. They adopted the 
culture of their US sister organizations, which was expressed in clothing styles such as 
cholos (wide trousers), armbands and necklaces, music (rap), tattoos (which the maras 
treat as their diaries, though they have now largely gone out of fashion), graffiti, a special 
alphabet, gestures in the style of sign language, and language (Spanglish, but with a very 
specific vocabulary). The mareros see themselves as obliged to lead a “crazy life” (vida 
loca). Among the young people who joined the mara clones were the children of families 
in which the fathers had emigrated to the USA or been killed in the war, and so were not 
there to bring up their children. Specialists have dated the origins of the Guatemalan 
maras to the mid-1980s.29 It is estimated that at that time there were more than 60 maras 
in Guatemala City alone. The Guatemalan maras are therefore not solely a postwar phe-
nomenon, even though their growth came after the war and can be traced back to the 
catalyzing effect of, above all, the Californian maras. 
Today there are two main mara gangs confronting each other – the 1830 and the MS 13, 
which is also known as the Mara Salvatrucha.31 These groups concluded a non-aggression 
pact and observed it for a while (Pacto Sur 13), but have been fighting each other with 
irreconcilable hostility since this pact broke down on 15 August 2005. Membership of one 
mara is all that is needed to provoke a member of the other,32 though police officers, bus 
drivers, and traders who refuse to pay marero “taxes” are as likely as other mareros to be 
 
 
 
29 Juan Merino, Las maras en Guatemala, in: ERIC/IDESO/IDIES/IUDOP (eds), Maras y Pandillas en Cen-
troamérica, Managua 2001, pp. 109-217, p. 113. 
30 Protagonists and former members of this mara insist that it is a pandilla (gang) and not a mara. “That is a 
great insult to us; for us, that word means a person who has Aids or leprosy.” Author’s interview with 
Mario, ex-marero, 16.03.06. Emilio Goubaud says that only the Mara Salvatrucha is a mara, and that it is a 
mistake to speak of the Mara 18, which should only be called “La dieciocho”. Author’s interview with 
Emilio Goubaud, Director General, Asociación para la Prevención del Delito, 16.03.06.    
31 “Salvatrucha” is derived from “salva” (save) or “salvadoreño”, and “trucha”, meaning “ready” or “smart”.   
32 Author’s interviews with M 18 mareros in the Pavoncito high-security prison, 29.03.06. 
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the targets of violence. Two sources of the hostility between these two maras can be iden-
tified. MS 13 and 18 came into existence and established their respective identities in two 
streets in Los Angeles, 13th and 18th Street. They also compete for a monopoly of the 
drugs trade in the prisons where the mareros serve their sentences. Even so, the members 
of the two gangs themselves are unable to point to any features of the other gang that 
would explain this enmity. In order to compensate, they “create” artificial differences via 
subcultural symbolic spaces. 
There are a wide range of opinions about who the maras are. These range from the so-
cial romantic view that they are victims of socioeconomic “rape” rather than criminals, or 
simply youth gangs and a specific form of youth culture, via the equally exaggerated claim 
that the maras are the violent criminals of the postwar period, and that they form an inde-
pendent drugs cartel rather than just cooperating with existing cartels,33 and even go as far 
as such absurd theories as the claims that they are a genuine guerrilla army,34 a branch of 
the police, or Satanists. Some recent commentators have even claimed that the maras are a 
specific kind of international terrorist organization with links to Al-Qaeda. 
With the exception of this last claim, none of these assessments is entirely false, but 
none of them is quite right either. It is possible to identify shifts and tendencies in the 
development of the maras, and the present-day maras are not the same as the maras of 
five or ten years ago. In Spanish, their development is described with the help of a se-
quence of three terms – barra, pandilla, mara. This captures a development from a non-
criminal youth group, via a street gang, to a criminal organization which should be classi-
fied as part of organized crime, or at least one that cooperates with organized crime.35 It is 
also the case that a desire to become a criminal is not the initial impulse among the per-
sonal motivations that prompt young people to join a mara. This only emerges in the 
mara itself, and so is not a reason for someone to join a gang.36 
A mara sees itself as an in-group, and demarcation from out-groups is an existential 
part of its identity. Within the group, the dominant discourse is of solidarity, affection, 
loyalty, and concern for the wellbeing of one’s fellow-members. In relation to out-groups, 
on the other hand, aggression is the dominant factor, so that a mara member who demon-
strates particularly aggressive and violent behaviour towards outsiders will become the 
recognized leader.37 The maras are organized into cells or clicas. These are named after a 
 
 
 
33 MS 13 works together with Mexican drugs cartels and helps to control the drugs transit corridor between 
Guatemala and El Paso (Texas). 
34 José Luis Rocha, quoting Max M. Manwaring, retired colonel, Professor of Military Strategy, former 
member of the US Army’s Comando Sur, in: José Luis Rocha, Mareros y Pandilleros: Nuevos insurgentes, 
criminales?, in: Envío, Vol. 25, No. 293, 2006, pp. 39-51, p. 39. 
35 José Miguel Cruz and Marlon Carranza, Pandillas y políticas públicas: El caso de El Salvador, in: Javier 
Moreno (ed.), Juventudes, violencia y exclusión. Desafíos para las políticas públicas. Guatemala 2006, pp. 
133-176, p. 143, 146. 
36 María L. Santacruz Giralt and Alberto Concha-Eastman, Barrio adentro. La solidaridad violenta de las 
pandillas, San Salvador 2002, p. 36. 
37 Ibid., p. 38. 
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city neighbourhood or its streets, and this provides a specific identity. Maras and clicas 
have a clear structure, both vertically with leaders (clechas, approximately ten per coun-
try38) and subordinates, and horizontally in terms of the concrete tasks they perform. Ac-
cording to Marlene Blanco, a police Sub-Comisaria, the maras are better organized than 
the police.39 They employ pseudo-democratic procedures such as mirins (gatherings of a 
clica), and subject themselves to a mafia-like code of behaviour, breaches of which are 
punishable by death. Under the terms of this code, no-one is permitted to leave the mara. 
The only possibility open is to become a “silent” marero, and this can only be done with 
the leader’s permission. At one time family reasons, e.g. approaching fatherhood, were 
accepted, but today only religious reasons are recognized. The maras apply very strict 
criteria in deciding whether the religious reasons given are genuine. 
On the one hand, the maras are popular today because they offer perfectly normal 
children and youths from lower social strata the possibility of comradeship, affection, 
solidarity, status, a purpose in life, and economic support and security. In this respect, 
they are no different from the original youth gangs. On the other hand, they have gone 
well beyond the stage of being harmless youth gangs: they collect “taxes” by means of 
death threats, are involved in the drug trade, have special sections made up of professional 
killers, control entire districts of towns, are organized on a pan-Central American basis, 
are in the process of infiltrating the ranks of the police, and legitimize, or rather propa-
gate, their actions with the help of pseudo-ideological-populist discourses. The double-
edged character of the maras is what makes it particularly difficult to deal with them. 
Should one see them as victims of unjust structures (which they undoubtedly are) and 
employ a “soft” strategy of prevention and reintegration? Or should one treat them as 
criminals (again, there is no doubt that this is what they are) who can only be dealt with 
by a firm hand? 
3.2.2. Lynch law 
Lynch law40 is a form of arbitrary law enforcement in which larger groups commit violent 
acts. In Guatemala, it is most common in rural areas. Suspected criminals (in most cases 
minor offences against property are involved) are punished publicly and in mob-like ac-
tions; they are usually killed. It is the public context of these actions, and the fact that they 
are carried out by a tumultuous mob, that distinguish lynch law from “social cleansing” 
and from other, individual forms of arbitrary law enforcement. Even tourists are some-
times among the victims. One incident that caused a sensation occurred on 29 April 2000 
in Todos Santos (Huehuetenango) when a Japanese tourist who had taken photographs of 
 
 
 
38 See Goubaud, footnote 30 above. 
39 Author’s interview with Marlene Raquel Blanco Lapola, Sub-Comisaria de PNC, Jefa Oficina de Atención 
a la Víctima, 24.03.06. 
40 The term originated with Charles Lynch, who in 18th century Virginia (USA) initiated the use of this 
special form of local and violent “law” against pro-British “conspirators”.  
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an indígena market, and while doing so approached a child, was lynched. The mob had 
been stirred up by “reports” that a Satanist group was abducting children for its rituals. 
Those responsible for these acts of lynch law are not habitual criminals or people with 
a long history of previous offences, but people who become criminals when they carry out 
a lynching.41 If lynch law was in the past a spontaneous matter, most instances of it today 
are planned and organized actions.42 Whistles, horns, or church bells summon people to 
carry out collective murder. There have even been cases where local radio stations, even 
broadcasting in one of the Maya languages, have called for a lynching and given concrete 
details of time and place. Victims are sometimes seized from their homes. They are often 
tortured first, then doused in petrol and burned to death. The corpse will then be put on 
display to deter others. This form of arbitrary law enforcement can be carried out by peo-
ple who suffered in the civil war or by those who inflicted suffering on others, but people 
who fall into neither of these categories are also responsible. Lynch law is directed not just 
against (suspected) criminals, but also against judges and police officers. This means that 
criminals and those responsible for prosecuting them are punished by a third authority. 
Mobs destroy police stations, town council buildings, and prisons, and sometimes they 
delete names from police registers. Lynch law does not always lead to the death of the 
victim. Between 1997 and 2004, there were 234 deaths as a result of lynch law in Guate-
mala. This was less than 1% of total homicides. 
The number of cases of lynch law leading to death rose steeply immediately after the 
war (54 in 1999) and has since then declined (to 7 in 2004).43 It was in 2003, just at the 
time when the general homicide rate rose, that the number of victims of lynch law 
dropped sharply. One reason for this may have been that there was a shift in the form of 
arbitrary law enforcement at that time, and it became something that was carried out in-
dividually or collectively but no longer by mobs.44 Nevertheless, lynch law is not yet a 
thing of the past. On 19 April 2006, church bells were rung in Sumpango, 50 kilometres 
west of Guatemala City. The mob gathered, and used force to seize from the police station 
a couple who had allegedly intended to abduct a seven-year old child. The couple were 
beaten, and then burned to death. The police were unable to prevent this.45 
Even though the number of victims of lynch law is in decline, there are a number of 
reasons why its causes should be investigated closely. (1) The number of victims of lynch 
law who do not die is still approximately three times that of those who are killed. (2) Each 
act of lynch law can involve up to 1,000 people on the side of the perpetrators (some of 
 
 
 
41 MINUGUA, Los linchamientos: un flagelo contra la dignidad humana, Guatemala Diciembre 2000, p. 6. 
42 Marta Estela Gutiérrez, Los mecanismos del poder en la violencia colectiva: los linchamientos en Huehue-
tenango, in: Carlos Mendoza and Edelberto Torres Torres-Rivas (eds), Linchamientos: Barbarie o “justicia 
popular”?, Guatemala 2003, p. 188. 
43 See FORPOL, footnote 9 above, p. 35. 
44 Author’s interview with Carmen Rosa de León-Escribano, Directora Ejecutiva, Instituto de Enseñanza 
para el Desarrollo Sostenible, 08.03.06. 
45 Prensa Gráfica, 20.04.06. 
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these will be passive). (3) These acts of violence are particularly cruel, as the victims are 
doused in petrol, set on fire, and crucified. (4) Within Central America, lynch law is spe-
cific to Guatemala – there have been no cases in El Salvador, where the general level of 
violence is higher. (5) This form of violence in Guatemala is also influenced by cultural 
factors, though not exclusively so. Three main patterns of explanation dominate the 
causal analyses that have been put forward in the past, and these sometimes appear in 
combination. Lynch law has been traced back to (1) the deficiencies of the state security 
sector, (2) cultural patterns, especially the customary law of the indígenas,46 and (3) a con-
tinuity between forms of violence that were learned during the war and then perpetuated 
after it.  
The argument that lynch law is a consequence of the inadequacies of the Guatemalan 
police and judicial system receives confirmation from opinion polls in which 75% of 
those questioned have expressed sympathy for the idea that people need to take responsi-
bility for law and order themselves, so lynching is permissible. One woman admitted:  
“We went to watch when they were setting them on fire. Ay, you should have seen how that 
stank, even my head hurt from the stench, and to see them melting like that [...]. I felt pity 
and I cried. But on the one hand I give thanks to God that they burned them. May God for-
give me, but its good that they finished them off.”
47
 
One frequently encounters the argument that the inadequacies of the security sector 
cause lynch law. It is argued that the protagonists of lynch law, who have few resources at 
their disposal, do nothing that is not also done by those who have ample resources and 
put private security services in charge of criminal prosecution. After all, this argument 
continues, both of these categories of actors are responding to the prevailing functional 
weakness of the state security sector by resorting to arbitrary law enforcement, even if they 
use different methods. Now, there can be no doubt that the Guatemalan security sector is 
extremely inefficient and that many crimes go unpunished. In addition, the statistics show 
that the police presence is particularly low in regions where cases of lynch law occur fre-
quently. But the explanatory force of this argument is reduced when one takes into con-
sideration the fact that the security sector in El Salvador functions no better, but there is 
no lynch law there. Another argument, the attempt to interpret lynchings as “acts of (per-
verse) political empowerment”48 which use spaces opened up by democratization, be-
comes dubious when one considers that El Salvador has experienced a democratization 
process that is similar to Guatemala’s, but has no lynch law. 
 
 
 
46 The term customary law is used to refer to uncodified or unwritten traditional legal norms which need to 
be distinguished from the positive law of a given country; see Rachel Sieder, Derecho Consetudinario y 
transición democrática en Guatemala, Guatemala 1996, p. 27.   
47 Quoted in: Angelina Snodgrass Godoy, Lynchings and the Democratization of Terror in Postwar Guate-
mala: Implications for Human Rights, in: Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2002, pp. 640-661, p. 
657. 
48 Angelina Snodgrass Godoy, Lynchings and the Democratization of Terror in Postwar Guatemala: Implica-
tions for Human Rights, in: footnote 47 above, p. 637. 
14 Heidrun Zinecker 
 
 
If one looks for differences between Guatemala and El Salvador that might explain the 
presence of lynch law in one country and its absence in the other, the first factor one is 
forced to consider is the high proportion of indígenas in the population of Guatemala and 
their almost complete absence in El Salvador. The statistics on violence point in the same 
direction: although lynch law also occurs in regions of Guatemala which are not areas of 
majority indígena settlement, such as Petén, more than 65% of cases of lynch law occur in 
those departments where indígenas make up more than 60% of the population - Quiché, 
Alta Verapaz, and Sololá. One finds repeatedly that in these departments, it is members of 
the comunidades indígenas who perpetrate lynch law.49 Attempts to explain this phenome-
non can easily get onto dangerous territory. It is all too easy to jump to the conclusion 
that indígenas are barbarians, or that lynch law is a Maya tradition going back centuries. 
Such conclusions would end up endorsing the racist argument that has been put forward 
since colonial times, to the effect that the “Indians” are the root of all social evils.50 
In fact, though, there is no death penalty in Maya customary law.51 Furthermore, al-
though the Mayas have been applying their customary law for over 500 years, lynch law in 
Guatemala first emerged in the 1990s. The Misión de Verificación de las Naciones Unidas 
(MINUGUA) has pointed out that lynch law is not an expression of indigenous law.52 The 
indígenas’ customary law is consensual and attempts, via mediation, to find solutions to 
conflicts that are acceptable to all parties. Lynch law does not meet this requirement. In 
the indígenas’ customary law, the discussion process is more important than the result. 
The result, in turn, is supposed to be based above all on morally sanctioned measures 
leading to self-reflection and self-correction on the part of the culprit.53 The most impor-
tant sanction foreseen by this system is compensation for the harm done in the form of 
work for the community. It is only in special cases that a prison sentence, exclusion from 
the community, or the handing of the culprit over to a justice of the peace is applied. It is 
true that customary law does not rule out corporal punishment within the family and 
even in public, but it has no place for lynch law or the killing of an offender. Maya repre-
sentatives say that it is not indigenous law but breaches of this law that explain the violence 
perpetrated by the indígenas.54 However, it is difficult to verify this as there was no way of 
measuring the effectiveness of indigenous law before and during the armed conflict. 
 
 
 
49 Carlos Mendoza, Violencia colectiva en Guatemala: una aproximación teórica al problema de los lin-
chamientos, in: Mendoza and Torres Torres-Rivas (eds), footnote 42 above, pp. 89-104, p. 91 ff. 
50 Raúl Zepeda López, Carlos López Chávez, and Samuel Monzón García, Las prácticas y percepciones del 
recurso a la violencia en Guatemala, Guatemala 2001, p. 64. 
51 Sergio de León Q., Marco Antonio Garavito and Nora Murillo, Percepciones de la violencia en Guatemala, 
Guatemala 1999, p. 50. 
52 See MINUGUA, footnote 41 above, pp. 7-9, p. 13. 
53 See Sieder, footnote 46 above, pp. 89-92. 
54 Author’s interview with Gregorio Mucu Maas, Q’alel, Maya priest, Consejo Nacional de Educación Maya, 
17.03.06.  
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We thus have a situation in which lynch law does indeed occur predominantly in in-
digenous regions, but it is quite alien to the Mayas’ customary law. One could therefore 
argue that indigenous arbitrary law enforcement occurs precisely in those places where 
the state oriented towards Western norms does not function, and that this is why this 
happens. Simultaneously, indígenas recognize only their own customary law, and not the 
Western law that guides the state institutions. It follows from this that the state’s failure to 
provide security is hardly likely to give the indígenas a reason to violate their own laws. In 
addition, one can assume that the fact that, despite the lynchings, the homicide rate in the 
indigenous regions is relatively low indicates that the search for peaceful solutions typical 
of indigenous law functions particularly well in precisely these regions.55  
The culturalist argument cannot be rejected out of hand, but it needs to be stated in a 
more differentiated way. In accordance with indigenous customary law, punishment has 
to be carried out publicly, in front of the assembled comunidad. Traditional behaviour 
patterns such as openness to public scrutiny and collectivity are repeated in lynch law. But 
it is only the form, not the intensity, of the violence that connects lynch law with indige-
nous cultural behaviour patterns – ladinos56 enforce law arbitrarily as well, but they do so 
in a more individual and less public way. The indigenous tradition of symbolic punish-
ment, on the other hand, would explain why lynch law involves punishing minor offences 
such as theft in a disproportionate way. 
There can be no doubt that the genocidal violence employed against the indígenas dur-
ing the war was extremely brutal; burning to death was, after shooting, the most common 
form of murder. Torture and murder have been inextricably linked, both in the ethnocide 
practised during the war and in the lynch law we have witnessed since then. There were 
669 massacres in Guatemala during the war (many more than in El Salvador), and these 
were concentrated on the indígenas, who were seen as the “breeding ground of the guer-
rillas”. In Guatemala, the army forced village communities to name candidates for execu-
tion as a deterrent against collaboration with the guerrillas. The army even burned chil-
dren to death in public in order to, as it put it, “put a stop to the breeding of commu-
nists”. One of the most vicious tactics used in the Guatemalan state’s counterinsurgency 
strategy was the way in which it saw to it that indígenas would sometimes be murdered by 
other indígenas, for example when they confronted the guerrillas as members of the 
Patrullas de Autodefensas Civiles (PACs).57 In this respect, one can assume that during the 
war, the indígenas learned from their tormentors the extreme forms of violence perpe-
trated against them, observed how the other side did this, and then internalized the ex-
perience. If one considers the way in which the civilian population was drawn into the 
civil war, across ethnic dividing lines, and the continuation of these practices that can still 
 
 
 
55 See Mendoza, footnote 49 above, pp. 110-112. 
56 Ladino is the word used for non-indígenas. It is also applied to people who have forgotten their mestizo 
past and adopted the creoles’ language and religion.  
57 Civil Self-Defence Patrols, units which operated as death squads during the war. 
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be observed today, one can also explain the lynchings that occur in Guatemala City and in 
Petén today and are perpetrated by ladinos.  
It is possible that the fact that the civilian population was more extensively involved in 
the civil war in Guatemala than in El Salvador explains why lynch law is a significant fac-
tor in the former country, but unknown in the latter. On the other hand, the force of this 
causal assumption is weakened by the fact that lynch law also occurs in Brazil, Ecuador, 
Mexico, and Venezuela. If lynch law occurs both in postwar societies such as Guatemala 
(but not in all postwar societies, as the example of El Salvador shows) and in societies that 
have not experienced a civil war (such as Brazil, Ecuador, Venezuela , and Mexico), this 
places a question mark over the hypothesis that lynch law is a fundamentally typical fea-
ture of postwar societies and is caused by the perpetuation of the war. 
4. Causes of violence 
No systematic analysis of postwar violence in Guatemala has yet been published. Those 
few attempts that have been made to provide one conform to the extreme models typical 
of research into the causes of violence: they either trace violence back to a single cause 
(such as poverty, inequality, or the inadequate functioning of the security sector) or iden-
tify an impossibly large number of causes. The first kind of analysis fails the large N test. 
The second finding makes it impossible to derive either elegant theoretical models or 
workable solutions. In methodological terms, one has to ask whether high levels of vio-
lence in general, and high levels of individual forms of violence, must all be traceable back 
to the same factors in order for these factors to be considered causal. Alternatively, is it 
possible – in the case of generally valid causal factors applying to violence as such – that 
other causes could also be “permitted” in part as explanations of individual forms of vio-
lence, without this leading to the collapse of the general model of explanation? This analy-
sis proceeds on the basis of the latter understanding of causality, a probabilistic under-
standing. This assumes that the absence of those factors which cause a low intensity of 
violence does not necessarily mean that the intensity of violence will be high. In other 
words, there can be no doubt that a functioning democratic state with the rule of law and 
a welfare state is the best guarantee of low levels of violence. However, it does not follow 
that there must be a high intensity of violence wherever democracy and welfare are not 
particularly strong. What I want to demonstrate here is that however desirable the estab-
lishment of a democratic state with the rule of law and a welfare state may be, violence can 
also be reduced if less complicated problems which can be dealt with in a much shorter 
time period are satisfactorily addressed. 
I begin by considering some factors which have frequently been considered likely 
causes of violence, and assess the general claim made to the effect that they explain con-
temporary violence in Guatemala. These factors can be excluded as general explanations, 
since – as I show – they are either also present in the same way in Nicaragua, or present in 
individual regions of Guatemala where the level of violence is low. It follows from this 
that they should not be present if they were the causes of the high intensity of violence in 
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Guatemala. After this, I try to develop a causal model of my own which can account both 
for the high level of violence in Guatemala and for the low level in both Nicaragua and 
some regions of Guatemala. 
4.1. Factors that do not cause violence 
4.1.1. The perpetuation of a culture of violence and/or of war-violence 
Even at the theoretical level, there are limits to the usefulness of the concept of a culture of 
violence. The very concept suggests circularity, the assumption from the start of what has 
to be proved58: (old) violence is thought to have led to a culture of violence, and this in 
turn is assumed to be the cause of (new) violence. The problem here is that a prolonged 
experience of violence may lead to an internalization of violence, but it can just as easily 
lead to a termination of violence if one has had enough of it. There are a number of rea-
sons why the idea of a culture of violence as the cause of contemporary violence in Gua-
temala is not a convincing model of explanation. 
Firstly, it is true that Guatemala has a long history of violence and that the 36-year war, 
with its 150,000 dead, was a particularly excessive period of violence. The argument that 
war-violence has perpetuated itself in the postwar period would also seem to be strength-
ened by the fact that there has been no significant variation between the average level of 
wartime violence and the postwar level (Figure 1). But this argument loses its force if and 
when the postwar level rises above the wartime one. The perpetuation of violence argu-
ment is also weakened by the fact that the highest levels of homicide in Guatemala today 
are to be found in those regions that were least affected by the war. The continuation hy-
pothesis is also contradicted by further considerations: war-violence has not been handed 
down, there is very little political violence, and it is not ex-combatants who are perpetrat-
ing violence but rather violent crime, which was kept very much in check during the war, 
that is dominant. When we see that Honduras, alongside Guatemala and El Salvador, 
belongs to the group of countries in Central America where the intensity of violence is 
greatest, but unlike the other two countries did not suffer a civil war in the course of the 
20th century, this is a further indication that the continuation model of explanation does 
not work. The weightiest consideration, however, emerges from a comparison between 
homicide rates in Guatemala and Nicaragua in the wartime and postwar periods. This 
shows that Nicaragua had a much higher homicide rate than Guatemala during the war, 
but has had a much lower rate in the postwar period; in 2004, the homicide rate was 36.3 
per 100,000 in Guatemala but only 3.4 in Nicaragua. 
 
 
 
58 Michael Riekenberg, Fuzzy systems, Max Horkheimer und Gewaltkulturen in Lateinamerika, in:  
Ibero-Amerikanisches Archiv, Vol. 25, No. 3/4, 1999, pp. 309-323, p. 310. 
18 Heidrun Zinecker 
 
 
Figure 3 Homicide rates in the 20th century civil wars in Guatemala and Nicaragua 
Nicaragua 
 
Guatemala 
1960 – 1996 1977 – 1979 1981 – 1989 
Length of war 36 years 2 years 9 years 
Total homicides  150,000 20,000 50,000 
Homicides per year59 4,166 10,000 5,555 
Homicides per year and per 
100,000 inhabitants 59.5 333 185 
Source: Relevant data (assuming 7 million inhabitants for Guatemala and 3 million for Nicaragua) 
Taken together, these considerations show that it is impossible to sustain the argument 
that a straightforward continuation of war-violence is the cause of Guatemala’s high level 
of postwar violence. This does not rule out the possibility that certain forms of violent 
action may be able to perpetuate themselves (as for example in the case of lynch law), but 
even this is only possible when other causal factors are also involved. 
4.1.2. Racism and ethnic exclusion 
Almost 40% of the population of Guatemala are indígenas with Maya roots, and the Ma-
yas are divided into 22 ethnic groups. Garifunas and Xincas together make up just over 
1% of the population. During the civil war an ethnocide was carried out against the 
indígenas, and 83% of all victims of violence were indígenas. One could conclude from 
this that racism and the exclusion of the indígenas are important causes of violence in 
postwar Guatemala as well. 
However, indígenas are today no worse affected by violence than ladinos. Postwar vio-
lence has no significant ethnic roots, and it is not ethnically fragmented. This does not 
mean that racism has been overcome; the assessment applies only to physical violence. 
The five departments with the highest homicide rates have small indigenous populations. 
Those with the highest percentages of indígenas in their populations, which are Totoni-
capán with 98.3%, Sololá with 96.4%, Alta Verapaz with 92.8%, and Quiché with 88.8%, 
have (in 2005) homicide rates of 7, 14, 11, and 8 per 100,000 inhabitants and so are at the 
lower end of the scale of violence. Violence is at its worst in Petén and Escuintla, where 
the indígenas make up 30.9% and 7.5% of the population respectively, and this places 
them in the lower half of the table in relation to the indigenous population.60 Only in the 
 
 
 
59 These figures are averages. 
60 Data provided by the Procuradoría de los Derechos Humanos (figures based on data provided by the 
PNC). 
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sphere of lynch law, which has never accounted for more than 1% of killings, do the fig-
ures suggest anything different, but even here the divergence is not great. 
4.1.3. Poverty 
It is frequently claimed that poverty causes violence. Crutchfield and Wadsworth’s chap-
ter on ‘Poverty and Violence’ in the Internationales Handbuch der Gewaltforschung con-
firms how firmly this viewpoint has established itself in the academic literature.61 Research 
on violence in Guatemala also contains a large number of statements of this view. At first 
glance this seems to be a logical position to take, and the hypothesis appears to gain in 
plausibility when one considers that developing countries tend to be more violent than 
industrialized countries.62 However, if one looks more closely and compares developing 
countries with one another, the suggested causal relationship is less persuasive. If this cau-
sality held, the poorest countries would have particularly high levels of violence. But this is 
not the case. Numerous counter-examples can be found, not only in many African states 
and India but also in Nicaragua, which is very poor by Latin American standards but has a 
low level of violence. 59.9% of Guatemala’s population lived below the poverty line in 
2002, and 69.3% of Nicaragua’s in 2001.63 
Even within Guatemala, it is not the poorest regions that are the most violent. The re-
gions with the highest intensity of violence are Petén, Izabal, Escuintla and Guatemala 
City. Jutiapa. Quiché, Alta Verapaz, Sololá, and Huehuetenango are considered to be the 
poorest, and here the homicide rate is exceptionally low.64 As already stated, the regions 
with the highest percentage of indígenas in the population are the very regions where the 
levels of violence are lowest. It is also the case that 76% of the indígenas are classified as 
poor and only 41% of the ladinos,65 which means that this indicator too provides no 
grounds on which one could establish a connection between poor indígenas and a high 
level of violence. The author found confirmation of this in interviews conducted in 2006 
with violent offenders imprisoned for murder. All of those interviewed said they did not 
come from the poorest strata of society; hence, poverty is not necessarily a motive for 
violence.66 
 
 
 
61 Robert D. Crutchfield and Tim Wadsworth, Armut und Gewalt, in: Wilhelm Heitmeyer and John Hagan 
(eds), Internationales Handbuch der Gewaltforschung, Wiesbaden (Westdeutscher Verlag) 2002, pp. 83-
103. 
62 Elías Carranza, Distribución del Delito y la Victimización en la Sociedad Global: Políticas de Persecución 
Penal. Conferencia dictada en el Congreso Nacional de Victimología de Costa Rica, Ministerio Público, 
Auditorio del Poder Judicial, Diciembre 5 del 2005. 
63 CEPAL, Panorama Social de América Latina (2002/2003), Santiago de Chile 2004, p. 282. 
64 See PNUD, footnote 14 above, pp. 325-327. 
65 Banco Mundial, La pobreza en Guatemala, Washington D.C. 2004, p. 3. 
66 Author’s interviews with members of the Mara Salvatrucha in the Boquerón high-security prison, 
24.03.06. 
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4.1.4. Inequality in the general distribution of income 
Poverty therefore provides no explanation of the high level of violence in Guatemala. This 
also applies to inequality, in the sense in which it is measured by the Gini coefficient as 
general distribution of income. Here too, correlations do not mean causality.67 In Guate-
mala, with its high intensity of violence, the Gini coefficient is 0.582, which is lower than 
in relatively non-violent Nicaragua, where the coefficient is 0.584.68 The case of Guatemala 
thus confirms the argument put forward by Erich Weede in his long-running controversy 
with Edward Muller, according to which there is no robust connection between inequality 
and susceptibility to violence in individual societies.69 The criminologist Günter Albrecht 
comes to the same conclusion in relation to violent crime.70 
The four factors identified are not causes of the high intensity of violence in Guate-
mala, either individually or collectively. However, one cannot exclude the possibility that 
there may be more specific expressions of these factors which do have causal effects, or 
that these factors may strengthen the causal effects of other factors, to which I now turn. 
4.2. Factors that do cause violence 
In the following, “positive” causal analysis, I employ an aetiological and socio-structural 
(macro) approach taken from criminology. The main claim made by this approach is that 
there are “conspicuous” societal structures which, in certain situations, exert pressure 
leading to deviant behaviour.71 Within this theoretical framework, the task is to distin-
guish between enabling structures, which make violence possible, and structures that may 
prevent it. Enabling structures provide fertile soil for crime in general, and violent crime 
in particular. If preventive structures are present, it is possible that outbreaks of (violent) 
crime may not occur even though enabling structures are present. If no preventive struc-
tures are present, or if they function badly, the effects of the enabling structures will be 
greater.  
 
 
 
67 See Carranza, footnote 62 above. 
68 Heinrich-W. Krumwiede, Soziale Ungerechtigkeit und Sozialstruktur in Lateinamerika, in: Petra Bendel 
and Michael Krennerich (eds), Soziale Ungerechtigkeit und Sozialstruktur in Lateinamerika. Frankfurt a. 
M. (Vervuert) 2002, pp. 57-79, p. 59. 
69 Erich Weede, On Political Violence and its Avoidance, in: Acta Política, Vol. 39, No. 2, 2004, pp. 152-178. 
70 See Albrecht, footnote 25 above, pp. 195-235.  
71 Aetiology treats crime as an objective fact for which a causal explanation can be found. Unlike the sociol-
ogy of crime and criminological meso and micro theories, it does not locate itself at the individual micro 
level but sees itself as offering explanations at the structural macro level of society as a whole. See Peter-
Alexis Albrecht, Kriminologie, München (C. H. Beck) 2002, pp. 31-33, 37-39. 
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4.2.1.  Enabling structures 
4.2.1.1. Regime hybridity 
In the literature on democratic civil peace, it is now widely accepted that neither democ-
racy nor authoritarianism per se generates a high level of physical violence. It is equally 
widely accepted that in the course of transition to democracy, the level of violence takes 
the form of an inverted U-curve, and that in statistical terms the highest level of violence 
will be found in semi-democracies.72 In my view, these semi-democracies can be described 
as hybrid regimes. 
Guatemala is a classic hybrid regime. The problem is, though, that while Guatemala 
with its high intensity of violence has a hybrid regime, so too does Nicaragua with its low 
intensity of violence. Freedom House (2006) describes the regimes in both of these coun-
tries as “partly free”, and gives Guatemala a higher rating than Nicaragua. The Bertels-
mann Transformation Index (2006), on the other hand, classifies Guatemala as a very 
defective democracy and Nicaragua as only a defective democracy. Polity Data IV (2003) 
gives both countries a rating of 8. My own view is that the last two of these assessments 
are too generous to both countries, but they are right to place them at roughly the same 
level. 
This means that in this respect, the correlation between regime hybridity and a high 
level of violence identified in the democratic civil peace literature is not to be found in 
Nicaragua. This, however, does not rule out the possibility that segments of the regime, 
such as the absence of the rule of law and political exclusion, and a poor performance on 
the part of individual segments, could cause violence. The performance of state institu-
tions is a constitutive component of a political regime. Where state institutions function 
poorly or do not function at all, we cannot speak of a democratic regime – a democracy 
that does not function is no democracy. Thus there can be no democratic regime without 
a high level of performance, but a high level of performance is possible without a democ-
ratic regime. In the latter case there is a conflict of aims between performance and democ-
ratic content, but in the former case there is no such conflict. However, if the security 
sector does not perform this is largely a matter of an absence of preventive structures 
rather than a presence of enabling structures. I therefore deal with this aspect in section 
4.2.2. 
4.2.1.2. Rent economy 
One can suspect that the causes of violence are to be found not in factors that have linear 
effects, such as poverty or inequality in the form in which it is measured by the Gini coef-
ficient, but rather in more integral, structural socioeconomic configurations. In order to 
find out whether this is the case, we can make use of the rent approach. However, this can 
 
 
 
72 See, for example, Havard Hegre, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates and Nils Petter Gleditsch, Toward a Democ-
ratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War. 1816 – 1992, in: American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 95, No. 1, 2001, pp. 33-48. 
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only be done if the whole spectrum of rents is taken into consideration and the concept of 
rent is not restricted to the production of primary goods and their proportion of GDP or 
decoupled from political determining factors. The task is therefore to find a model of 
rents that is open both internally, to the existence of several different types of rent, and 
externally in terms of links to political structures. The work of Hartmut Elsenhans pro-
vides us with such a model.73 In Elsenhans’s conception, one element of a rent economy is 
a marginal labour force whose members have the physical prerequisites needed to pro-
duce more than they need to support themselves and their families, but who cannot do 
this because the means of production are too limited. Because the status of labour is low, 
so too are the levels of real wages and mass income. This leads to systematic restrictions 
on internal market relations. This in turn implies that there are few incentives for invest-
ment and innovation, so self-generating capitalist development becomes impossible. If it 
is the case that rents and the restriction of labour, rather than capital and labour, confront 
each other in such a way that there is no guarantee of any floating equilibrium of supply 
and demand, a further hypothesis can be added to Elsenhans’s argument. The argument 
from opportunity costs suggests that it makes sense for marginal economic actors to look 
for an alternative form of market access. Violence is a readily available substitute that can 
be employed without any great difficulty. In using this approach, it is important to note 
that it is this surplus in the structure as a whole that indirectly encourages violence, not 
the individual forms of rent directly and as such. 
As we have already seen in relation to regime hybridity, the problem is that not all rent 
economies are characterized by a high level of violence. Here again, Nicaragua is an ex-
ample. We therefore need to know under what specific configurations of rent the suscepti-
bility to violence that is typical of rentier economies develops into actual violence. It is not 
each individual form of rent that causes certain intensities of violence, but the total con-
figuration as a system. The explanation for this is that it is only certain new forms of rent 
that encourage violence today, because they reinforce the bipolarity between the oligarchy 
and the poorest of the poor by providing an outlet for this structure. On the other hand, 
rent economies which are characterized by old (agrarian) rents (coffee, cotton, sugar, and 
banana rents) and which are now putting pressure on these old rent structures open up 
space for relative socioeconomic egalitarianism, and hence do not produce violence. 
Particularly pronounced bipolarity between the oligarchy and the lowest quintile 
This kind of relative socioeconomic egalitarianism is present in Costa Rica and Nicaragua, 
but not in Guatemala. In Guatemala we find a dominant, rent-appropriating oligarchy 
with extremely high status and, in contrast to Costa Rica and Nicaragua, greater depriva-
tion among the lowest quintile of the population. This specific constellation of bipolarity 
 
 
 
73 Hartmut Elsenhans, Wirtschaftsliberalismus ohne bürgerliche Revolution: Wer stützt die liberale Wirt-
schaft im Süden?, in: Wolfgang Hein (ed.), Umbruch in der Weltgesellschaft. Auf dem Weg zu einer 
„Neuen Weltordnung“?, Hamburg (Deutsches Übersee-Institut)1994, pp. 101-124, pp. 106-108. 
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is not the same thing as the general inequality of income distribution measured by the 
Gini coefficient.  
In Guatemala there are around 20 white families, most of them descended from the 
conquistadors or from German immigrants, which form a hermetically sealed and self-
regenerating oligarchical nucleus.74 This elite is formally represented in up to 27 state in-
stitutions. These “big boys” also make use of their informal “derecho de picaporte”, the 
right to knock on the door of the highest state authorities at any time of day and under 
any circumstances.75 In Guatemala, to a greater extent than in any other Central American 
country, policy – and that includes security policy – is made through oligarchical interest 
groups. Nicaragua, on the other hand, has no such hermetically sealed oligarchy. Here the 
economic elite is a hybrid made up of an old and a new oligarchy (which is weak by Cen-
tral American standards) and a weak bourgeoisie. This hybrid is both less hermetic than in 
Guatemala and less exclusive in its relations with other social strata, and it is more pater-
nalist. 
If the economic meaning of oligarchy is control of the production structure of a coun-
try on the basis of rents, and if its political meaning is the opposite of mass politics, then 
the free market economy and an egalitarian potential associated with this will be strength-
ened by an oligarchy that weighs less heavily on a country; the egalitarian potential is also 
political. This is the case in Nicaragua. In Guatemala the weight of the oligarchy is greater, 
and this has the opposite effect. This finding is confirmed by the proportion of national 
income available to the counterpart of the oligarchy, the lowest quintile of the population. 
Guatemala’s lowest quintile have 2.1% of the country’s income, and Nicaragua’s have 
4.2%; this places Guatemala at the bottom and Nicaragua at the top of the Central Ameri-
can table for this indicator.76  
Nicaragua’s place in these rankings corresponds to the fact that it is the only country in 
Central America that, in the course of a revolution, implemented a radical agrarian re-
form which has today been consolidated in respect of some at least of its results. Guate-
mala experienced the second most effective revolutionary agrarian reform, but the results 
of this reform were nullified by the failure of the 1944-54 revolution. The analogous re-
sults of the Nicaraguan Sandinistas’ distribution of land to small-scale and medium-scale 
peasants and farmers were not reversed.77 As a result, the disadvantages suffered by the 
lowest quintile in Guatemala can be seen most clearly, in the first instance, in rural areas. 
 
 
 
74 Marta E. Casaús Arzú, Reflexiones en torno a la legitimidad del Estado, La Nación y la Identidad en el 
marco de los acuerdos de paz en Guatemala, in: Anuario de Estudios Centroamericanos, Vol. 25, No. 1, 
1999, pp. 7-31, p. 9. 
75 Alexander Segovia, Integración real y grupos de poder económico en América Central, San José 2005, p. 
89 f. 
76 UNCTAD/UNDP, Globalization, Liberalization and Sustainable Human Development: Progress and 
Challenges in Central American Countries, no place of publication given, 2000, p. 21. 
77 Author’s interview with ex-Comandante Jaime Wheelock, former minister of agriculture, Director of 
IPADE, 22.09.06 (Nicaragua). 
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The effects of this are high rates of migration, and the better the situation is in these areas, 
the lower will be the level of migration. This applies both to internal migration to urban 
centres and to emigration abroad. Where there is large-scale migration from rural to ur-
ban areas, as in Guatemala, peripheral urban zones come into existence which are both 
very densely populated and, most importantly, relatively poor. This involves employment 
in precarious and informal circumstances, for example in the maquila. Violence is con-
nected with this and concentrated in the same areas. The classic example of this in Gua-
temala is Villa Nueva, a dormitory town on the periphery of Guatemala City which has 
the second highest level of violence in the country. The inhabitants of Villa Nueva are 
migrants who work in Guatemala City, do not identify with their dormitory town, and so 
do not create any networks of communal solidarity.  
New rents as an outlet for oligarchical structures and a catalyst of violence 
In Guatemala, the bipolarity of oligarchy and the lowest quintile that has its traditional 
roots in old agrarian rents still exists today, because the bipolar system that showed signs 
of breaking up during the civil war is now being sustained by new outlets, and therefore 
by new rents. In addition to rents from stocks and bonds and (if one uses a broad concept 
of rents) the maquila, remesas are the most important new form of rent. Remesas are re-
mittances sent by Guatemalans working abroad to their families at home, and are a sig-
nificant source of foreign currency. It is true that these remittances improve the economic 
situation of the family members remaining in Guatemala and increase their purchasing 
power. Nevertheless, they serve indirectly to make the country more susceptible to vio-
lence because they usually cannot be invested. This means that: 
– They create an outlet for oligarchical structures by reducing the pressure on the oligar-
chy to do anything to create jobs for, and improve the purchasing power of, the lower 
strata. They thus shore up the unproductive oligarchical configuration. 
– They reduce the incentives motivating the family members remaining in Latin America 
to work themselves. 
– They make it more likely that male heads of families will emigrate to the USA and that 
the families remaining in Latin America will disintegrate, which makes it more likely 
that the children left at home will drift into violence.  
They also lead directly to greater violence in Guatemala, because: 
– The Guatemalan children and young people who emigrate to the USA with their par-
ents are socialized in the maras there, and if they commit criminal offences they are 
deported back to Guatemala where, as “homies”, they import their experience of vio-
lence into the Central American maras. 
Remesas are a particularly significant factor for Guatemala and El Salvador, but less so for 
Nicaragua. In 2002 they amounted to $130.32 per head of population for Guatemala, 
$330.48 for El Salvador, and only $76.37 for Nicaragua (the figure for Costa Rica was 
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$39.34).78 The especially high level of remesas for El Salvador corresponds to the highest 
level of homicide in Central America. Looking more closely at this comparison, we find 
that Guatemalans account for 25.9% of the all Central Americans resident in the USA and 
Nicaraguans for only 5.24%.79  
One is struck by two further differences between Guatemala and Nicaragua which are 
very closely connected with the directly violent effects of remesas and which can explain 
the higher level of violence in Guatemala. When Guatemalans emigrate to the USA, most 
of them go to Los Angeles, the home of the original maras. In 2000, 125,146 Guatemalans 
emigrated to Los Angeles. Nicaraguans, on the other hand, mostly emigrate to Miami 
(31,233 of them in 200080), where there is no such gang tradition and so no possibility of 
the corresponding violent socialization. Only 4% of Central Americans in Los Angeles are 
Nicaraguans. In addition, many more Guatemalan than Nicaraguan emigrants are de-
ported from the USA back to their home country; between 1998 and 2002 the figures were 
39,669 Guatemalans and 5,026 Nicaraguans.81 
More deportations from the USA, and especially from Los Angeles, of violently social-
ized emigrants mean a stronger catalyzing effect on the level of violence in the country to 
which they return. However, the significance of this factor should not be exaggerated, 
since this would mean treating all the causes of violence in Guatemala as imports and 
ignoring the fact that a fertile national soil must be present if the large number of deport-
ees are to exert this catalyzing effect in practice. Nevertheless, it is always the case that new 
rents, especially remesas, cause violence both indirectly (as a new outlet for rent struc-
tures) and directly (as a vehicle of violent socialization). 
Low rates of investment and weak empowerment of labour 
A low intensity of violence is fostered by investment in the autochthonous, non-
oligarchical production of investment goods, which excludes rents and leads to the em-
powerment of autochthonous labour. If no such investment takes place, the argument 
from opportunity costs suggests indirectly to marginal actors that they should look for an 
alternative form of access to the market. Violence is available as a simple substitute that 
can be readily employed. Unlike remesas, high rates of investment in the local production 
of investment goods, as can be observed in Nicaragua where the figure is 33.3% (2001), 
promise not only increased consumption but also the creation of jobs in the local econ-
 
 
 
78 See www.acs-aec.org/columna/index69.htm. www.eclac.cl/celade/proyectos/migracion/Torres.doc. www. 
americaeconomica.com/numeros3/206/reportajes/jameson206.htm. www.conamype.org/biblio/pdf/0322. 
pdf. lanic.utexas.edu/~sela/AA2K2/ENG/docs/Coop/migra/spsmirdi1302/spsmirdi302.3.htm (Last up-
dated 02.12.04).  
79 PNUD, Informe sobre el Desarrollo Humano 2005: una mirada al nuevo nosotros, el impacto de las mi-
graciones, San Salvador 2005, p. 60. 
80 FLACSO, La transnacionalización de la sociedad centroamericana: visiones a partir de la migración, San 
Salvador 2005, p. 7. 
81 See Rocha, footnote 34 above, pp. 47-48. 
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omy and, as a result, the empowerment of labour and ultimately the dismantling of rent 
structures. Low rates of investment, such as we find in Guatemala where the figure is 
15.9% (2001), prevent this.82 These rates only confirm a tendency, since it is clear that the 
reason why they are so low or high may be that there was a great deal of, or very little, 
investment in the past. 
As we have already seen in relation to other indicators, Guatemala and Nicaragua are 
to be found at opposite ends of the scale where this comparison is concerned. However, 
the figures for rates of investment do not by themselves indicate whether investment in 
the production of investment goods is actually taking place. A helpful indication can, 
though, be found in the figures for the proportion of processing industries in GDP, where 
the gap between Guatemala (10.6%) and Nicaragua (22.2%) is almost as great as for rates 
of investment.83 
This means that in Guatemala, low rates of investment in processing industries making 
up a low proportion of GDP imply weak empowerment of labour. If the further hypothe-
sis, “weak empowerment of labour implies high levels of violence”, is to be confirmed, we 
would have to find a particularly high level of unemployment in Guatemala (especially by 
comparison with Nicaragua). This, though, is not the case; in 2002, the urban unemploy-
ment rate was 11.9% in Nicaragua and only 3.6% in Guatemala.84 But this is only at first 
glance a problem for our model. Statistics for unemployment in Latin America are unreli-
able, as the unemployed do not register. In addition, the figures reflect only official un-
employment and not unemployment concealed by the informal sector. The informal sec-
tor is particularly marked by the absence of formal employment relations and is not sub-
ject to state control. It is mainly located in the urban centres, and is characterized by rela-
tive rather than absolute poverty. 
Concealed unemployment, like official unemployment and emigration as a result of 
economic necessity, is a reflection of a structural surplus of labour power that is not ab-
sorbed by the labour available and thus of marginalization. Because it is chronically un-
able to find normal employment, part of the unemployed population creates employment 
for itself in the informal sector (autoempleo). Employment in the informal sector means a 
chronically low income, and exclusion from the system of public social benefits such as 
education and health care. In 2003-4, the informal sector accounted for 75.4% of non-
rural employment in Guatemala85 and 58% in Nicaragua.86  
Comparing Guatemala and Nicaragua with Costa Rica, one can identify a further cor-
relation: the higher a country’s level of development, the lower will be the proportion of 
the economy accounted for by the informal sector. If the informal sector reflects con-
 
 
 
82 See webforum.org/site/knowledgenavigator.nsf/Content. 
83 FLACSO, Centroamérica en Cifras, 1980 – 2005, San José 2006, p. 148. 
84 See CEPAL, footnote 63 above, pp. 239-240. 
85 See PNUD, footnote 14 above, p. 347. 
86 OIT, Panorama Laboral 2005, Lima 2005, pp. 98-99. 
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cealed unemployment, then one can deduce a connection between the significance of the 
informal sector and a high level of violence. This holds for Guatemala and El Salvador. It 
would then follow that for Costa Rica and Nicaragua, there is a connection between low 
concealed unemployment and a low level of violence. This would imply that those who 
are active in the informal sector, or their families, are to a considerable extent responsible 
for the high level of violence in Guatemala. 
However, the author is not aware of any figures giving details of the proportion of vio-
lent criminals who come from the informal sector. Interviews conducted with violent 
criminals (including mareros who have committed homicide) in the penal institutions do, 
though, establish that these offenders do not come from absolutely impoverished strata 
where no work at all is available, but from relatively poor strata associated with the infor-
mal sector and its concealed unemployment.87 One can suspect that there is a further con-
nection between violence and the extremely high level of precarious employment relations 
we find in Guatemala.88 Precarious employment relations, like activity in the informal 
sector, mean the absence of empowerment of labour, which lies at the heart of the argu-
ment I am putting forward here. We can therefore conclude by saying that, despite the 
relatively low official level of unemployment, the model of a lack of empowerment of 
labour is indeed one of the causes of violence in Guatemala because concealed unem-
ployment is so high. 
4.2.2.  Structures that might prevent violence, but are absent 
4.2.2.1. The poor performance of the state security sector 
Regime performance must be measured by the capacity of the institutions of the state and 
civil society to function as they are supposed to. Where the analysis of violence is con-
cerned, what we need to know above all is the extent to which the regime is able to guar-
antee public security. The comparison between Guatemala and Nicaragua is astonishing 
in this respect: in a World Bank evaluation of public security for 2001, where 6 was the 
best possible score, Guatemala scored 2 and Nicaragua 4.89  
This wide gap between Guatemala’s poor result and Nicaragua’s good one makes it 
clear that the poor performance of the security sector could be a causal factor in relation 
to the high level of violence in Guatemala. This possibility can be tested by looking more 
closely at the two central institutions in the security sector, the police (which in Guate-
mala is part of the Interior Ministry or Ministerio de Gobernación90) and the judiciary 
 
 
 
87 See Mareros, footnote 32 above. 
88 Juan Pablo Pérez-Sáinz, Katharina Andrade-Eekhoff, Santiago Bastos and Michael Herradora, La estructu-
ra social ante la globalización. Procesos de reordenamiento social en Centroamérica durante la década de 
los 90, San José 2004, p. 82. 
89 World Bank, World Development Report 2000/2001. Attacking Poverty, Oxford 2001, pp. 39-42. 
90 The Interior Ministry is involved at the beginning and end of the legal process. The police, who answer to 
the Interior Ministry, take the first step when they launch a criminal investigation. At the moment when 
the trial comes to an end and a defendant who has been found guilty is transferred to a penal institution, 
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(which is represented by the Ministerio de Gobernación, the Ministerio Público or Public 
Prosecutor’s Office, the Defensa Pública Penal which provides public defence lawyers, and 
the Corte Suprema de Justicia or Supreme Court).91 Surveys reveal that with regard to the 
effectiveness of the police, the same gap exists as we have noted for the performance of the 
security sector. An international survey of businessmen conducted in 2001-02 put Gua-
temala in 69th place in the world and Nicaragua in 47th place.92 The following pages identify 
a number of deficiencies of the Guatemalan police, though this does not mean that there 
are no police officers who carry out their duties in a committed, responsible, and often 
unselfish way, for example by paying out of their own pockets to compensate for the lack 
of institutional resources in areas such as supporting the victims of crime. 
The poor performance of the police 
With the transition to democracy, decisive reforms designed to demilitarize and profes-
sionalize the Guatemalan police were introduced. Unfortunately, no-one foresaw that 
such serious security problems would arise in postwar Guatemala, so this issue was not 
adequately addressed in the peace negotiations or in the plans to restructure the police, 
for example in the police academy’s syllabus. The peace treaty stated that the police 
should be restructured into a single national civilian police force, with 55% of officers 
coming from the old police and 45% newly appointed. As it turned out, 75% of the new 
force were reciclados, as those who had already served in the old police were known.93  
At the beginning of 2006 there were 21,000 posts for police officers, but holidays, shift 
duties and sick leave mean that only 14,000 officers are on duty at any one time.94 Just 
over 50% of these officers are stationed in Guatemala City. The presence of the police 
across the country is therefore unsatisfactory. However, Leonardo Martínez, Director of 
FORPOL, points out that more policemen do not necessarily mean less crime. It is more 
important that the police should actually be present in the places where they are needed. It 
is still the case, Martínez explains, that police officers go for a walk rather than patrolling, 
and that their presence is a matter of aimless “wandering about”.95 But a light police pres-
ence does not necessarily lead to high levels of violence, as can be seen from the fact that, 
with the exception of Jutiapas, the regions of Guatemala where violence is at its most in-
tense have a relatively heavy police presence.96 In addition, there are complaints about 
 
 
 
the Interior Ministry takes over again because it is responsible for the penal system. In between, the other 
three institutions of the security sector are responsible.    
91 There is no ministry of justice in Guatemala. The (deputy) minister of justice is subordinated to the min-
ister of the interior, which is a problem for the independence of the judicial system. 
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inadequate policing presence in Nicaragua too, but here there is less violence. Both of 
these considerations show that even where the police presence is light, police work can be 
efficient and of high democratic quality.  
The Guatemalan police arrest less than 10% of those responsible for homicides.97 Their 
investigations also leave a great deal to be desired. Even in cases of homicide, it is some-
times over a year before a suspect is arrested. There are only 300 specialists responsible for 
criminal investigations, and 120 of these work in administrative posts.98 Particular prob-
lems arise when crime scenes need to be cordoned off and evidence collected, and also in 
the areas of surveillance of criminals, the formulation of hypotheses, and planning. It 
frequently occurs that the fire service or relatives who have found the body of a murder 
victim destroy important evidence, and no-one stops them doing this.99 This deficiency is 
made even more significant by the fact that Guatemalan courts, problematically, place 
greater weight on circumstantial evidence than on statements from witnesses. Because the 
crime rate is so high, an additional secret service has been set up that is supposed to work 
on crime prevention. However, at the time of writing this civil secret service had not yet 
started to function, because no budget had been approved for it. The police have very 
little capacity to combat organized crime, especially money laundering and the drug trade. 
Because their resources are so limited the police concentrate on large-scale crimes, 
which means that smaller crimes can build up and a certain tolerance of them develops – 
even among the police themselves.100 The police are not, as they should be, on duty 24 
hours a day. One example from the sphere of support of victims will serve to demonstrate 
this. A woman who had been raped and was suffering genital bleeding wanted to report 
the crime to the police on a Friday. She was told to come back on Monday, as a shortage 
of staff meant there was no-one on duty on Friday who could deal with her. Of course, she 
did not return. This ensures that violent crime goes unreported.101 
Only 14% of police officers are indígenas.102 A number of ethnic groups are not repre-
sented in the police at all, so that in many regions it is impossible for the population and 
the police to communicate with each other. In general, the police’s channels of communi-
cation with the comunidades are poor. Although neighbours in Guatemala usually know 
each other, policemen often do not even know the names of their neighbours.103 Nor do 
 
 
 
97 See Martínez, footnote 95 above; author’s interview with Alejandro Giammattei Falla, Director General 
del Sistema Penitenciario, 13.03.06. 
98 See Martínez, footnote 95 above. 
99 Author’s interview with Mauricio Ross, Secretario Privado del Fiscal General, and Gerardo Alberto Hur-
tado Flores, Secretario Privado, Ministerio Público, 14.03.06. 
100 Author’s interview with Hugo Leonel Colindres Morales, Comisario, General Adjunto de la Policía Na-
cional Civil, 17.03.06. 
101 See Blanco, footnote 39 above. 
102 MINUGUA, Informe de Verificación. La Policía Nacional Civil: un nuevo modelo policial en construc-
ción, Abril de 2001, p. 8. 
103 See Blanco, footnote 39 above. 
30 Heidrun Zinecker 
 
 
the police know the laws. The people they arrest are not informed about their rights, al-
though the regulations require police officers to do this.104 The police are also unable, and 
sometimes unwilling, to do anything to stop vigilante attitudes and behaviour on the part 
of members of civil society. Victims and witnesses avoid reporting crimes or making 
statements to the police, because they do not trust them and because witnesses cannot rely 
on the police for protection. How can a trader be expected to report an incident of extor-
tion of protection money to the police when the marero responsible lives just round the 
corner? Extortion of protection money does not even appear in police statistics, because 
no-one reports it. 
The police torture people they have arrested, and sexually molest imprisoned women. 
One survey of 154 women conducted in July 2005 in the Santa Teresa detention centre 
found that 29% of those surveyed were stripped naked after being taken to the police sta-
tion. 33% reported sexual propositions. 6% denounced sexual abuse, 25% experienced 
death threats, and 34% were tortured. 62% of the women reported that men had exam-
ined their sexual organs.105 
The police are corrupt. If they see an opportunity to benefit financially, they “over-
look” minor and even major offences. They also force victims to pay them before they will 
take down evidence pertaining to smaller offences, or at least demand that they pay for the 
petrol they have used to drive to the scene of the crime. The police let maras and other 
criminals go because they are bribed by them. In city districts, police officers must agree 
to become part of the tax system created by the maras, either because their superior offi-
cers demand that they pay them contributions106 or because their own pay is inadequate. 
Because policemen nevertheless have to make a specified number of arrests, they also ar-
rest innocent people “por portación de cara”,107 and justify this by saying they were behav-
ing suspiciously, and/or they plant marijuana on people as “proof”.108 These offences are 
committed by the very same police officers who are supposed to be combating the drug 
trade and abductions.109 
The police are in theory subordinate to the Interior Ministry, but in practice they are 
to a considerable extent independent and work on their own account. One of the things 
that makes this possible is the fact that the senior police officer in the country is one of the 
big businessmen who appoint themselves to all the posts that really matter in Guatemala. 
Disciplinary proceedings against police officers are sluggish affairs. A period of up to two 
years can elapse before an officer who has committed a serious breach of regulations is 
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forced to leave the police. During this time he can continue to work and to carry out acts 
of corruption, torture, or sexual violence.110 
Because they are incapable of arresting criminals and furnishing adequate proof of 
their guilt, the state and therefore the police need to identify a category of a priori univer-
sal culprits. The mareros fit the bill perfectly. Anyone who is young and has a tattoo is 
likely to be arrested as a marero, even though not all young people with tattoos are mare-
ros and not every marero has committed an offence. The Guatemalan Congress has dis-
cussed the possibility of making the maras as such illegal, so that membership of a mara 
would be punishable by law. This is already the case in Honduras. In Guatemala it is de 
facto, though not de jure, the case. Another reason why this form of collective punish-
ment is seen as something worth striving for is the fact that the security sector is unable to 
establish which marero has committed a given murder by means of conventional criminal 
investigation. Police officers support one mara as a way of combating a rival gang more 
effectively.111 Mareros are considered to be terrorists, having replaced the guerrillas as the 
new enemy of the regime. This provides an additional legitimation of the army’s involve-
ment in internal security. Treating mareros as a priori universal culprits also legitimizes 
the way other offences are ignored. When an offence is committed against a marero, he is 
“only” a marero and no investigation of the case is considered necessary. Sergio Morales, 
the Ombudsman for Human Rights, comments: “The police kill people”, participating in 
“social cleansing” actions directed above all against mareros.112 
It is true that in Guatemala, unlike El Salvador, the “heavy hand” (“mano dura” or 
“super mano dura”) is not the officially declared government policy. In practice, though, 
this is what happens – whether in the framework of the Plan Escoba or of the Planes Op-
erativos. Deputy Interior Minister Silvia Vásquez told the author that the government is 
not in favour of the “mano dura” and is seeking instead to improve investigative proce-
dures, to reestablish public trust in the ministries, and to improve crime prevention, but it 
is also in favour of harsh punitive measures to deal with offenders.113 One can see that 
although a desire to avoid the “mano dura” is expressed, the authorities cannot do with-
out it either practically or in conceptual terms. In Nicaragua the police carry out duties in 
the field of social work, but in Guatemala there is a narrow understanding of both the 
dimension of prevention and the range of actors addressed by preventive measures.  
Guatemala differs from El Salvador in that the country’s constitution provides for the 
army to be involved in internal as well as external security. A number of different argu-
ments have been put forward to explain the close connection between army and police: it 
is said to be necessary for logistical reasons; the army does the dirty work and so ensures 
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that the state does not have to get its hands dirty; this means that the army still has the 
possibility of moving back into central areas of domestic politics114; the army competes 
with the police, and so has an interest in seeing to it that the police force remains weak – 
and, since the army enjoys greater political influence, it is able to ensure this.115 This point 
is also related to the “parallel apparatuses”, the links between the army and organized 
crime that can be traced back to the civil war. These apparatuses operate outside official 
institutional structures, and therefore have an interest in weakening those structures, es-
pecially since the trade in private security is an extremely lucrative business. A police force 
that functioned “too well” might disrupt this business. 
At present, Guatemala employs a total of 2,400 members of the army for internal secu-
rity purposes, which is the largest number of any Central American country. 5,000 sol-
diers are available in total to work alongside the police – patrolling, protecting penal insti-
tutions and tourist centres, and controlling traffic. According to Silvia Vásquez, in these 
“combined patrols” cooperation between police officers and soldiers is preferred to coop-
eration between the police and the civilian population.116 In all these duties the police take 
the lead, but they do not have disciplinary control because soldiers do not accept the po-
lice’s disciplinary regime.117 Hugo Leonel Colindres, who at the time I interviewed him 
was Deputy Chief of Police, summed up the police’s attitude by saying: “If the soldiers are 
well trained, they are welcome.”118  
Overall, the Guatemalan police force is or has been faced with four dilemmas:  
1. As a new institution, the police force already had to function perfectly at a time when it 
could not yet function at all. The highest levels of postwar violence had already been 
reached at a time when the police had not even attained their full manning levels, and 
indeed when, under the terms of the peace agreements (before 1999), they could not 
yet have done so. 
2. The police force’s most serious shortcoming is its lack of competence in conducting 
investigations and shortage of equipment. In order to compensate for this the police 
have to be present on the ground, but here too the resources at their disposal are inade-
quate. 
3. Since the police are unable to solve crimes because of this shortage of resources, or 
unwilling to do so because of corruption, they have to let criminals go. But because 
they have targets to meet, they arrest innocent people.  
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4. The police know from El Salvador that the “mano dura” as a response to violence 
makes the situation worse rather than better. However, they have no concepts of crime 
prevention or rehabilitation of offenders. Nicaragua could be an important point of 
reference here, but it is too late to introduce a straightforward copy of the Nicaraguan 
prevention model.  
Crimes go unpunished in Guatemala in a chronic way. The roots of this situation are to be 
found not only in the deficiencies of the police sector that have been identified here, but 
also in those prevailing in the judicial sector. It is because of these deficiencies that, even 
after offenders have been charged, they are released before the trial has run its course.  
The poor performance of the judiciary 
Before the peace agreements, the judiciary was heavily dependent on the executive and 
legislature. It had traditionally been the least transparent and responsible of the three 
powers. The judiciary is still extremely hierachical and bureaucratic. However, the peace 
agreements have made it more independent.  
The greatest success has been the Public Prosecutor’s Office, which has been set up 
within the Ministerio Público. Previously, judges had both conducted investigations and 
presided over court proceedings. These two functions have now been separated, which 
means that the Public Prosecutor at least has a high degree of independence. The greatest 
failure is the fact that the makeup and work of the judiciary does not yet correspond to 
the principles of multiethnicity, multilingualism, and multiculturalism, and that it is not 
recognized by the indigenous peoples. There is no profile of indigenous customary law 
that is approved by the state, and no consensus about how to agree on recognition of this 
law. There is no conflict of laws that regulates all lawsuits involving a “foreign” law ele-
ment which could establish how the central legal system and customary law should relate 
to one another, and in which spheres they should be applied. The indígenas’ customary 
law is only recognized by the state as it applies to minor offences. When serious crimes 
such as murder are committed, central bodies have to take over. The indígenas ask why 
this distinction is drawn, and why respect for customary law should not extend to all of-
fences.119 It also turns out to be necessary to hand cases over to central bodies when perpe-
trator and victim belong to different comunidades indígenas, because each comunidad has 
its own customary law. A further difficulty arises when an offender has already been pun-
ished in accordance with indigenous customary law, but it then emerges that the crime 
was serious enough to fall within the jurisdiction of a central court, the problem being 
that it is not permissible to convict the same person more than once for the same offence. 
Guatemala has the weakest judiciary of any country in Central America.120 If a country 
spends only 2% of its GDP on the judicial sector but 3% on sport, this gives a good indi-
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cation of the state’s relative priorities. There is no democratic, law-governed state in Gua-
temala. Authoritarian structures still exist in the judiciary. Critics complain about a con-
centration of judicial power in the Supreme Court, corruption, intimidation, and the way 
in which crimes go unpunished. Corruption is considered to be the main problem affect-
ing the judicial sector. In one survey, only 5.2% of those questioned said they thought the 
judiciary was “not very corrupt”, and the rest – almost 95% - said they thought there was 
a high degree of corruption.121 The percentage of crimes that go unpunished is also ex-
tremely high; at over 90%, it is the highest in Central America.122 The Ombudsman for 
Human Rights told the author that even when people are arrested on suspicion of having 
committed an offence involving a danger to life, 95% of these crimes go unpunished. 
Overall, only 0.05% of all crimes investigated by the judicial authorities are carried 
through to a conclusion.123 At the same time, 64% of those imprisoned have not been duly 
convicted by a court of law.124  
There are not enough courts, and the majority of the population have no access to 
lawyers.125 Within the judicial system the work to be done is unequally distributed, which 
means that in some cases employees have to work unpaid overtime.126 Even in the case of 
an offence the excessive length of trials means that witnesses can no longer remember 
important details. This leads to contradictions in their evidence, leading in turn to uncer-
tainties, as a result of which the trial ends with a decision in favour of the accused when-
ever there is any doubt. Gaps in the law mean that members of organizations involved in 
“social cleansing”, for example the Defensores del Pueblo in Sololá, are wrongly released 
in a way that does not even involve an infringement of the law. The Public Prosecutor’s 
Office has no clear system of sanctions to be applied when employees make mistakes. 70% 
of the judges do not obey the instructions of their superiors, and offer passive resistance. 
There are hardly any sanctions in cases of shoddy work. If sanctions are imposed when, 
for example, an official abuses his or her position, the trade unions are able to find ways of 
obstructing them. As a result, all those working in the judicial sector feel quite safe in their 
jobs and do not feel they have to do much work. It is especially difficult to dismiss public 
prosecutors.127 Judges and public prosecutors who perform their duties conscientiously 
and are not corrupt, on the other hand, risk their lives – as the Chiquimula case showed 
(see section 3.1 above). 
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As in the police sector, the weakest point in the work of the judicial sector are the 
criminological investigative measures that are supposed to secure evidence when a crime 
has been committed. The reasons for this are to be found not only in the shortage of re-
sources, but also in the fundamental philosophy that prevails.128 Because it is so difficult to 
collect circumstantial evidence and statements from witnesses that are of sufficiently high 
quality, the officials responsible deny that this is the root of the problem. Rather than 
admit these weaknesses in the functioning of the security sector, they try to lay the blame 
at the door of the presumption of innocence, which is a new principle for the Guatemalan 
legal system. Officials working in the judiciary are annoyed by this principle, and like to 
speak of it as an “ultragarantista” idea.129 Opponents of the principle say that it serves to 
encourage criminal activities because suspicion alone is no longer, as it used to be, a suffi-
cient basis on which to arrest someone. It is, some officials say, “quite wrong” to think 
that penal institutions should serve the purposes of rehabilitation and the continuation of 
prisoners’ education.130 According to this way of looking at the matter, anyone who calls 
for the prioritization of prevention, rehabilitation, and respect for human rights is en-
couraging crime.131 As a result, there are no programmes designed to provide these things 
and offenders are released from prison into a vacuum. As Alejandro Giammattei, director 
of the Guatemalan penal system, puts it, prison is seen as the end of the judicial process. 
No-one takes into account the fact that, in reality, the system operates as a vicious circle: 
after leaving prison, offenders return to society with greater criminal resolve and with a 
better criminal “education” than they had at the moment when they were imprisoned. In 
fact, between six and eight of every ten prisoners could be rehabilitated, but the system 
does not give them a chance.132 
The penal institutions “have been forgotten by the state, and democracy has not ar-
rived here”.133 The most one can say is that there is a democracy of the capos; one of them 
controls the trade in alcohol, another the drug trade, and a third the trade in mobile 
phones. The prisons contain twice the number of prisoners they were built to hold, one of 
the reasons for this being the fact that many innocent people are imprisoned. The inmates 
therefore build their own accommodation within the prison grounds, and do this with the 
consent of the governors. They have to provide for themselves. Prisoners who do not re-
ceive support from outside often have to sleep on bare cement floors. The penal system 
does not distinguish between those who have been sentenced and those awaiting trial, or 
between juveniles and adults.  
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There is no law covering the penal system, and no disciplinary code regulating the in-
stitutions of detention. Consequently, there are no institutional sanctions. The prisoners 
themselves provide internal order. One of the largest prisons, Pavón, was for a long time 
completely under the control of the prisoners, with the security forces only guarding it 
from the outside. Even today, Pavón is entirely in the hands of the drug trade, which 
launders its money via the Guatemalan branch of a European NGO which is active inside 
the prison. The inmates bribe the warders in a systematic way, which gives them control 
of the prisons. In this way, mobile phones and drugs even enter prisons via the main en-
trances. Giammattei reports that one prisoner offered him one million quetzales for a 
transfer to another prison; his monthly salary is 15,000 quetzales.134 In October 2005, 19 
inmates of the high-security prison at Escuintla succeeded in escaping through a tunnel 
they had built – with, needless to say, the connivance of the well-bribed warders. There 
are frequent instances of large-scale violent conflict between inmates, between the mem-
bers of different maras, between clicas belonging to the same mara, between those who 
have traditionally enjoyed the monopoly of the drug trade and maras who want to chal-
lenge that monopoly, and also because of personal disagreements. The prisons are “uni-
versities of crime”; those who do not enter them as criminals certainly come out as crimi-
nals. Giammettei’s period as head of the penal system has seen the previously dominant 
focal point of penal philosophy, security, combined with a concern for administration and 
rehabilitation. Giammattei has succeeded in preventing a number of prison revolts. He is 
the fifth occupant of his post within two years. After he had received a number of death 
threats, he was the victim of an assassination attempt on 30 March 2006. Fortunately, he 
was not hurt. 
The Guatemalan judiciary faces a fundamental dilemma. On the one hand, it must se-
cure a sufficiently large space for the (voluntary) observance of laws enacted by a state 
under the rule of law, as democratization proceeds; on the other hand, because the levels 
of violence are high, it considers itself obliged to punish offences especially severely, pre-
cisely because of the democratization process. The idea is that this can be done by making 
provision for heavier sentences under criminal law. This view is based on the quite erro-
neous theory of general prevention, which holds that extremely severe penalties will deter 
potential murderers because they will work out the appropriate cost-benefit calculation.135 
We have seen the imposition of heavier sentences since the 1990s, in Central America in 
general and in Guatemala in particular. Societies undergoing democratization frequently 
try to defend themselves by punishing their “enemies” with particular severity.136 Simulta-
neously, a harsh and repressive criminal law is supposed to compensate for technical and 
procedural shortcomings. In Guatemala, a prison sentence of up to 50 years can be im-
posed for murder. The death penalty is also on the statute book. 
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No Guatemalan government in the postwar period has had an integral plan for inter-
nal security. During the war the “national security” model was dominant, and this was 
supposed to be replaced by “citizens’ security” after the war was over. Now, though, the 
country is on the point of returning to the “national security” model – but this time using 
the maras, rather than the guerrillas, as the excuse. Unlike Nicaragua, where the police 
work well but the judicial sector functions badly, no part of Guatemala’s security sector is 
weaker than the others. As Álvarez Ortíz, the Deputy Minister for Support of the Judicial 
Sector, has put it, the weakness of the security sector is “an integral issue”.137  
In Nicaragua the judiciary functions less well than the police, but this is not the case in 
Guatemala. One could draw from this the conclusion that the performance of the judici-
ary is irrelevant to the intensity of violence, but there are at least two reasons why this 
conclusion would be mistaken. Firstly, it is only when the judiciary functions well that 
good police work is sustainable, and secondly, the level of intensity already reached by the 
violence affects the judiciary in its efforts to limit violence. Where excellent preventive 
work by the police is successful in keeping the level of violence low, as is the case in Nica-
ragua, there are fewer violent offenders against whom criminal prosecutions will be initi-
ated in the first place, even when the prosecution system functions badly. There will then 
be correspondingly fewer offenders who, if they escape punishment, will be able to carry 
on with their violent activities. In Guatemala, on the other hand, where things are already 
much worse, every gap in the judicial system means a possibility that, because the judicial 
sector performs poorly, the level of violence will rise because offenders who are not con-
victed immediately commit new offences. 
4.2.2.2. The poor performance of civil society in the security sphere 
There is very little activity in Guatemala that could be described as participation by civil 
society in efforts to limit violence by democratic means. During the civil war, social net-
works at the local level were destroyed. Moreover, the main thing civil society had learnt 
in this period was to carry out violent actions rather than to limit them (primarily via the 
PACs). There was no possibility of acquiring experience in pacification. Communal soli-
darity was further weakened by emigration, the disintegration of families, and the break-
down of indigenous traditions. 
With peace-building came attempts to launch local civil society structures that would 
support the new police – the Comités de Vecinos Pro-Construcción (Neighbourhood 
Committees for Construction) and then the Juntas Locales de Seguridad (Local Security 
Councils). The fact that these Juntas were set up on the orders of local police chiefs, with-
out any consultation with civil society, speaks volumes about the extent to which they 
were rooted in the population. The fact that they were usually headed by mayors or a sen-
ior police officer also says a great deal about the independence of the impulse from civil 
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society. In some towns, the setting up the Juntas even made conflicts between the citizens 
worse. Elsewhere, the population simply assumed they were the same thing as the PACs.138  
Civil society’s low level of participation in the security sphere is in keeping with the 
poor performance of the security sector, since civil society actors need the support of the 
police if their commitment to providing more security is not to turn into a suicide mis-
sion. If they do not receive this support, they feel an obligation to compensate for the 
weakness of the state by arming themselves and becoming vigilantes. There is a thin line 
between democratic commitment on the part of civil society and vigilantism. On the one 
hand, one can hardly blame civil society actors when, as has happened in Quetzaltenango, 
they become so desperate that they decide to help themselves by taking up arms and orga-
nizing patrols in town districts badly affected by violence where the state security sector is 
absent or insufficiently present. On the other hand, this leads to the calling into question 
of state structures, especially when members of vigilante groups render themselves 
anonymous by wearing ski masks, engage in arbitrary law enforcement, and take over the 
monopoly on the use of force themselves. This line becomes even harder to identify when, 
as has happened in Villa Nueva with the Waldemar programme, telephone lines are set up 
so that people can pass on information about suspects anonymously, and the police do 
not even have the resources to follow up the information provided. Or, to take another 
example, when Observatorios de Paz are established where citizens keep watch over what 
their neighbours are doing, in order to be able to pass on information about the security 
situation. The police, for their part, do not expect civil society’s commitment in the secu-
rity sphere to provide anything more than information; in one survey, 44% of those ques-
tioned said this.139  
There are some exceptions. In Santa Lucía Cotzumalguapa, for example, which was 
once - like Villa Nueva – among the towns with the highest levels of violence, the mayor 
has succeeded in reducing the level of violence and keeping it low. He even managed to do 
this while the resources available from outside were declining, but he cooperated closely 
and democratically with civil society – that is to say, without favouritism towards his own 
political allies and by behaving respectfully towards leading local personalities.140 If one 
compares the success of such efforts in this municipio with the sustained lack of success in 
Villa Nueva, the municipio with the second highest level of violence in Guatemala, one 
notices a number of sociostructural differences. The most significant difference, though, 
seems to be the fact that unlike the mayor of Santa Lucía, who belongs to the URNG but 
was never an active combatant, and has served the comunidad and the “integral human 
development of its citizens” in an “unpolitical” way,141 the mayor of Villa Nueva, a former 
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interior minister, has politicized cooperation with civil society very strongly and pro-
claimed this cooperation from above, without any consideration for the opinions actually 
held in society. He has simultaneously brought in a large number of international projects 
to work in the security sector. These projects compete with each other to such a degree 
that in the end, despite or precisely because of the inflow of resources from outside, the 
results for the limitation of violence are negligible.142 If the number of international NGO 
projects were anything to go by, Villa Nueva would have to be the safest town in Guate-
mala, not the second most unsafe.143  
We can see that in Nicaragua, unlike Guatemala, a high level of participation by pri-
vate sectors which is, in some respects, similar to the situation in Santa Lucía Cotzumal-
guapa correlates with a high level of perfomance by state institutions in the security 
sphere. We can conclude from this that civil society cannot compensate for a weak secu-
rity sector; it can only function as well as the security sector. 
5. Conclusion 
Guatemalans have a popular saying: “In our country, there is no reason not to commit 
murder.” This report, too, has identified a number of such grounds. In summary, its ar-
gument is as follows: Enabling structures permitting a high level of violence are particu-
larly likely to come into being when rent-appropriating oligarchies are subjected to a po-
litical and economic liberalization process but are able, by diverting old agrarian rents 
into new rents (remesas, but also rents from stocks and bonds and maquila), to create 
economic outlets for oligarchic structures which in turn make it possible for them to 
modernize themselves to a remarkable degree without losing their rents, and at the cost of 
a disproportionate weakening of work. For Guatemala, the concrete implications of this 
are an extreme bipolarity between the oligarchy and the lowest quintile of the population, 
low levels of investment in the investment goods industry, and a low level of empower-
ment of labour. 
The possibility of a high intensity of violence becomes reality when regime hybridity is 
present. This implies the existence of non-democratic regime segments such as political 
exclusion and the absence of the rule of law. It also implies the absence of structures that 
might prevent violence, because there are shortcomings in the performance of state insti-
tutions, especially the police and judiciary, and also in the democratic commitment of 
civil society in the security sphere. In concrete terms, this can be seen in the performance 
of the police, who are simultaneously inefficient and repressive, and in the fact that the 
judicial system is characterized by both a harsh criminal law and a failure to convict of-
fenders. Neither civil society nor the private economy play any role in security policy.  
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Two models are available which make it possible to limit violence in the long term, or, 
to put it another way, to ensure a low intensity of violence. In the first model a low inten-
sity of violence is achieved directly, via a long historical path in which “Democracy = Per-
formance + Democratic Content” is combined with “Social Market Economy = Empow-
erment of Labour + Production of Investment Goods. Western industrialized countries, 
and Costa Rica among Central American countries, have taken this path. In the other 
model, a low intensity of violence is achieved indirectly and via a shorter path. In this case, 
there is no need to call into question the absence of democracy, and so the existence of 
regime hybridity, or the absence of a social market economy, and so the existence of a rent 
economy. Instead, the specific configurations that were identified in section 4.2 as causes 
of the high levels of violence in Guatemala, which follow as a result of the macrostruc-
tures, are either avoided or removed. This is what has happened in Nicaragua. Since it is 
evident that this model can work, we can draw a decisive conclusion which confirms the 
hypothesis put forward in section 4: it is possible to limit violence even without getting rid 
of poverty, inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient, ethnically based exclusion, or 
even a rentier economy and regime hybridity. 
Guatemala, though, is not Nicaragua, and the high level of violence is already a fact of 
life there. There is therefore a need for further conceptual and practical measures to limit 
violence, and development aid can make a contribution here. These measures should in-
clude supporting the police and judiciary in their work designed to prevent violence and 
rehabilitate violent offenders, and support for the improvement of criminal investigation 
procedures, work with victims, and implementing consistent criminal justice policies. In 
addition, civil society’s contribution in the security sector must be strengthened, though 
not in such a way that vigilantism is encouraged. Finally, a degree of socioeconomic egali-
tarianism is needed in order to improve the situation of the lowest quintile of the popula-
tion. This can be done if smaller enterprises are supported as a counterweight to the rul-
ing oligarchy, in the context of increased investment in the production of investment 
goods. This should make it possible to reduce both the official level of unemployment and 
concealed unemployment in the informal sector, leading to the empowerment of labour. 
These measures should be combined with international pressure on the USA’s policies on 
immigration, integration, and deportation. The US administration sees violence in Cen-
tral America as a threat to US security, and forgets that the maras, the main protagonists 
of current Central American violence, originated in the USA’s own major cities, especially 
those in California. Guatemala should be encouraged in, and receive support for, efforts 
to integrate young people deported from the USA.  
If a security governance policy on these lines is to succeed, the precondition is detailed 
knowledge, based on painstaking analysis, of the violence it seeks to limit. Contrary to the 
assumptions of most security governance analysis, in many postwar societies it is no 
longer the case, and has not been for some time, that ex-combatants are responsible for 
violence or that new wars begin. What we are confronted with is a new kind of violence in 
peace, which has already become well established. This violence in peace is on the point of 
establishing itself as an independent order of violence, and it has already spread its tenta-
cles beyond Guatemala and even beyond Central America. 
